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INTRODUCTION

This Article studies the effect of representation on decisionmaking in three disability programs that resolve claims by nonadversary procedures. Statements that lawyers help claimants
generally rest on the assumption that disputes are resolved in an
adversary setting.' But a large number of public welfare claims are
decided by informal, nonadversary procedures. 2 One hearing examiner has described the threefold role of the administrative judge
in these proceedings:
It seems strange, but we use the terminology that we 'wear three
hats.' We put on the first hat, and we represent the claimant, we
The "great role of the defense lawyer ... is to keep the trial process in balance so
that the adversary system can function." H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 372
(1966). If counsel on each side were equally competent, an empirical study would not
detect any helpful effect of counsel. That is why Kalven and Zeisel found that superior
counsel for the criminal accused produced a jury acquittal where the judge would have
convicted in only one percent of the cases they studied. Id. at 371-72. In the vast majority
of cases, counsel were evenly balanced. Id. at 372.
For example, in fiscal 1974, 1,237,000 claims were received from former workers for
Social Security disability benefits. The total number of claims in fiscal 1974 for Supplemental Security Income, after subtracting duplicate claims and claims incorrectly reported, was
1,531,052. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION FOR FISCAL YEAR
1974, at 11, 23 (House Ways and Means Comm. Print, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1975).
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present all the testimony on his behalf, and drag it out of him by
questioning. We then represent the government, the Social Security Administration, and search the law-that's the second hat.
We search our minds, and we search whatever other records
are available, we search the evidence, and we present the best
case that the government has. Then we turn around and put on
decide which evidence is most favorable,
the third hat, and we
3
and in whose behalf.

In this nonadversary setting, representatives might not help
the claimant win. In fact, a view commonly encountered among
administrators is that the agency adequately protects the claimant's
interest. 4 Lawyers, they claim, only disrupt these informal, cooperative proceedings by insisting on the use of adversary procedures that increase administrative costs without any benefit to
the client. 5 Moreover, utilizing counsel may increase the claimant's
costs; many consider this a major problem in income maintenance
programs.6
Most lawyers are likely to share another view: vigorous advocacy will increase the claimant's chance of prevailing. Proponents
of this position view administrative decisionmakers as naturally
biased in favor of their agencies, and consider the nonadversary
7
process incapable of counteracting this bias.
The data in this study show that represented clients usually

3 Rausch v. Gardner, 267 F. Supp. 4, 6 (E.D. Wis. 1967) (quoting the hearing examiner).
4 This study does not deal with agencies reputedly hostile to the claimant. Thus, no
state-administered welfare programs are included. For discussions of welfare representation and administration, see Carlin & Howard, Legal Representation and Class Justice, 12
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 381, 398-401 (1965); Mashaw, Welfare Reform and Local Administration of
Aid to Families with Dependent Children in Virginia, 57 VA. L. REV. 818 (1971); Sparer, The
Role of the Welfare Client's Lawyer, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 361 (1965). With some reservations,
commentators generally give Social Security "good marks" in helping claimants. See Haviland & Glomb, The Disability Insurance Benefits Program and Low Income Claimants in
Appalachia, 73 W. VA. L. REV. 109, 136 (1971); Viles, The Social Security Administration Versus
the Lawyers... and PoorPeople Too (pt. 1), 39 Miss. L.J. 371, 391-95 (1968).
5 See P. NONET, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE 104-24 (1969), for a discussion of the role of
lawyers in transforming the function of a workers' compensation agency from problemsolving to claims-adjudication. But see Gellhorn & Lauer, Administration of the New York
Workmen's Compensation Law (pt. 2), 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 204, 209 (1962) (lawyers avoid courtroom histrionics in agency proceedings).
6 For this reason, the agency is often required to approve the reasonableness of counsel fees. See notes 118, 123, 127, and accompanying text infra.
See Thibaut, Walker, & Lind, Adversary Presentation and Bias in Legal Decisionmaking,
86 HARV. L. REV. 386 (1972).
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have an advantage over unrepresented clients even in informal,
nonadversary proceedings. 8 The results were analyzed to discover
the relationships between representation and the various procedures used in different programs, such as the use of outside experts to advise the agency on the merits of the claim, the ability of
the claimant to present new evidence on appeal, and the use of
hearings. 9 Small sample sizes and the inaccessibility of data, however, prevented complete analysis of the interactions among these
variables.
This Article also attempts to develop a framework for deciding
whether representation should be encouraged or discouraged. The
study concludes by outlining the significant policy issues involved
in deciding whether to encourage representation in the nonadversary process, and explains what empirical data and value judgments are relevant to the resolution of these issues.

I
SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL FEATURES OF
THE PROGRAMS STUDIED

A.

Outline of the ProgramsStudied
1. FederalEmployees' CompensationAct: Substantive Features

The Federal Employees' Compensation Act' ° (FECA) is a
workers' compensation program providing benefits to federal employees suffering from job-related disabilities. Disability occurs
when the worker either suffers a loss of wage-earning capacity or
incurs a disability that is listed on the statutory schedule." Once a
"schedular" impairment is proven, the statute automatically provides for the payment of benefits for a specified number of
weeks.' 2 Proof of loss of wage-earning capacity is much more dif8

See Tables 1A & 1B infra.
9See Tables 2A-5 infra.
10 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8150 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). The accompanying regulations appear at 20 C.F.R. §§ 10.1-.505 (1976).
It 5 U.S.C. §§ 8105-8107 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
12 For example, in FECA the number of weeks for total impairment of the arm is 312,
for the leg, 288, and for the hand, 244. 5 U.S.C. § 8107(c)(I)-(3) (1970). Partial impairment of a part of the body results in recovery for the percentage of impairment times the
number of weeks provided for total impairment of that part of the body. Id. § 8107(c)(19).
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ficult than proving a "schedular" impairment. The worker whose
disability is "unscheduled" must not only prove the existence of an
impairment but also the effect that impairment has on ability to
work in the relevant labor market.1 3 Benefits in either case are not
paid until it is clear that there will be no further improvement in
the claimant's condition. Prior to14that time, the claimant is eligible
for temporary disability benefits.
Workers' compensation programs differ from other disability
programs in that the impairment must be job-related. 15 For example, a claimant with heart trouble must prove that his disabling
condition originated with or was aggravated by his work.' 6 However, it is generally believed that the agencies administering the
FECA program give the claimant the benefit of the doubt. 7
2. FederalEmployees' Compensation Act: ProceduralFeatures
An FECA claim is filed at a district office of the Office of
Workers Compensation Programs (OWCP). s8 The responsibility
for developing the facts and deciding a claim rests with a claims
examiner,1 9 who is typically neither an attorney nor a doctor.2 °
13 In

FECA, the claimant's local community is the relevant job market. Alexander A.

Mihok, 22 Empl. Comp. App. Bd. 210, 212 (1971).
14 20 C.F.R. § 10.301(b) (1976).
'5 See 5 U.S.C. § 8102(a) (1970). The statutory phrase in FECA is "performance of
duty," but it has the same meaning as "arising out of and in the course of employment." A.
LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 1.10 (1972). These programs are financed by employers, whose liability varies with their accident experience. This cost is
supposed to induce safety precautions. A work-connection requirement, therefore, seems
fair, and may even be a constitutional requirement. Compare Bountiful Brick Co. v. Giles,
276 U.S. 154, 158 (1928), with Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976).
In FECA, benefits are charged to the employing agency's budget (5 U.S.C. § 8147(b)
(1970)), but the cost is not analogous to an insurance premium on a private sector em-

ployer.
16 See, e.g., Henry W. Jones, 17 Empl. Comp. App. Bd. 658 (1966). Other issues that
may arise are the following: (1) satisfaction of time periods for filing notices and claims; (2)
entitlement to a lump sum award commuting periodic payments; (3) coverage for medical
expenses when treatment is not by a doctor; (4) interpretation of foreign workers' compensation laws that determine ceilings on FECA benefits for certain foreign employees; (5)
entitlement to benefits under more than one program; (6) termination of a medical impairment. See Chart 8 infra, at note g.
11 M. Gilhooley, The Federal Employees' Compensation Act 8 (Jan. 20, 1972) (unpublished manuscript prepared for the Administrative Conference of the United States)
[hereinafter cited as Gilhooley-FECA].
18 20 C.F.R. § 10.106 (1976). OWCP replaces the Office of Federal Employees' Compensation and its predecessor, the Bureau of Employees Compensation. Id. §§ 1.5-6.
9
1 d. § 10.130.
20 Gilhooley-FECA, supra note 17, at 11.
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Medical and vocational experts on the staff of OWCP and from
outside the agency can be called upon to help the claims examiner
decide a case. 2 1 The claimant has no right to a hearing at the initial
stage of the proceedings, although a face-to-face meeting between
the claims examiner and the claimant occasionally takes place. 2
The proceedings are nonadversary; 23 neither the employing nor
the decisionmaking agency appears in opposition to the claimant.
A dissatisfied claimant may ask the Division of Hearings and
Review (DHR) in the National Office of OWCP to reconsider the
claim and grant a hearing,2 4 but need not do so to obtain further
review. Decisionmakers at this stage are not lawyers or doctors.25
They can, however, obtain technical advice from experts on the
staff or from outside the agency. 6 DHR will accept new evidence
and will conduct hearings at a place convenient for the claimant if
he so requests.27 The claimant is usually the only witness at the
hearings. Cross-examination is allowed, but the experts who provided advice to the agency are not made available for cross-examination. The proceedings are nonadversary.
If the claimant loses at either the claims-examiner or DHR
stage, he may appeal to the Employees' Compensation Appeals
Board, 28 whose three members are all lawyers. 29 The Director of
OWCP may request that an appealed case be remanded to OWCP
for further consideration; this procedure is used only when the
21Id. at 12-14.
21 Id. at 16.
23 20 C.F.R. § 10.140 (1976).
24Gilhooley-FECA, supra note 17, at 18-19; Interview with Gaylord Williams, Director,
Division of Hearings and Review, OWCP, in Washington, D.C. (June 21, 1973); Interview
with Herbert A. Doyle, Jr., Director, OWCP, in Washington, D.C. (June 21, 1973). The
right to a hearing is provided by 5 U.S.C. § 8124(b) (1970) and 20 C.F.R. § 10.131 (1976).
25 Gilhooley-FECA, supra note 17, at 18; Interviews cited in note 24 supra.
26 5 U.S.C. § 8123(a) (1970).
27 The right to a hearing dates from the 1967 amendments to the FECA-Pub. L. No.
90-83, 81 Stat. 210-11 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 8124(b) (1970)).
Unions opposed placing the hearings under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). Amend the FederalEmployees' Compensation Act: Hearings on S. 2517 and H.R. 10721 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm.
on Labor and Public Welfare, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1966) (statement of John A. McCart).
They may have felt that their position as claimant representatives would have been
threatened or that procedures would have become too formal. Cf G. STEINER, THE STATE

OF WELFARE 278-79 (1971) (veterans organizations opposed changes in procedures used to
decide veterans claims).
2 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.1-.13 (1976).
219Gilhooley-FECA, supra note 17, at 21; Interview with E. Gerald Lamboley, Chairman
of the Employees' Compensation Appeals Board, in Washington, D.C. (June 21, 1973).
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CHART 1

Outline of Decisionmaking in the FECA Program

Agency: District Offices of OWCP.
Number of claims processed: 22,450 (fiscal 1972)."
b
Percentage won:
Appeal to: Nat'l Office of OWCP or Employees' Compensation Appeals Board.
Source of data: Employment Standards Administration, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Statistical Report, Federal Employees' Compensation Act, Fiscal Years 1971-72, at table 3
(Sept. 1972).

Agency: DHR, Nat'l Office of OWCP.
Number of appeals processed: 599 (fiscal 1973).
Percentagewon: 70%
Appeal to: Employees' Compensation Appeals Board.
Source of data: Office of Federal Employees' Compensation, Fiscal Year Report of Division of Hearings and Review (July 31, 1973).

-

Attorney in office of Solicitor, Dep't of Labor: Reviews all
cases appealed, and may recommend remand to National
Office of OWCP.

--

Agency: Employees' Compensation Appeals Board.
a
Number of appealsprocessed: 112 (fiscal 1971)
Percentage won: 27%e
Appeal to: No judicial review.
Source of data: Gilhooley-FECA, supra note 17.

a The agency processed 113,655 notices of injury, but most of them were noncompensable
(73,613), covered by leave time (16,142), or not followed up by a claim (1,450).
b The agency disapproved only 2,670 claims in fiscal 1972, but the figure is misleading. All
allowances, even if they are only for medical expenses or simply less than the claimant
seeks, are recorded as approvals in the agency's statistics.
"Wins" include 78 remands, which is 19% of the total number of wins (N=417). Claimants
abandoned an additional 115 cases.
d The Board also decided two cases in which attorneys sought higher fees than DHR allowed.
These cases have been excluded from the statistics.
e "Wins" include remands. Agency figures do not distinguish between outright wins and remands.
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facts are not fully developed, or when opinions of experts are
unexplained or in substantial conflict.3 0
Gases that reach the Board are reviewed on the record. The
Board will not accept new evidence but does allow oral argument.3 '
In each case, one Board member takes primary responsibility for
analyzing the germane factual and legal disputes without the help
of legal assistants. 3 2 Although a Department of Labor attorney defends OWGP's decision, 3 3 the Board independently analyzes the
record to determine the merits of the claim. There is no right to
34
judicial review of the Board's decisions.
3. Social Security: Substantive Features
The Social Security program provides benefits to totally disabled individuals whose disability can be expected to result in death
or to last at least twelve months.3 5 There is no requirement that the
disability be job-related; the claimant must, however, have worked
long enough in jobs covered by the Social Security program to have
3 6
obtained "insured status.
In every disability case the Social Security Administration
(SSA) must determine if the claimant, given his disability, can
nevertheless find substantial gainful employment.3 7 The complex3'Interview with E. Gerald Lamboley, supra note 29. In practice, the Attorney in the
Solicitor's Office of the Department of Labor responsible for representing OWCP before
the Board decides when to request a remand.
31 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c), .5 (1976). The Board's office is in Washington, D.C., however,
and members do not travel to hear oral arguments.
32 Interview with E. Gerald Lamboley, supra note 29.
33This is the only adversary stage of any program in the study.
345 U.S.C. § 8128 (1970). The Board is the only agency studied that publishes its
opinions.
3542 U.S.C. § 423(a), (d) (1970). Social Security also provides benefits to certain disabled dependents of eligible workers: surviving disabled spouses at least 50 years old (id.
§ 402(e), (f) (1970 & Supp. V 1975)), and children who become disabled prior to reaching
age 18 (id. § 402(d)).
36 42 U.S.C. §§ 414, 423(c)(1) (Supp. V 1975). The period is a number of calendar
quarters in employment covered by the Social Security program out of a longer period
immediately prior to the onset of disability. If a claimant is out of work for a long time, he
may lose his insured status. In such cases, he may try to prove that the onset of disability
occurred at an earlier date when he was insured. He may also try to prove earlier onset to
obtain benefits for a longer time. See id. §§ 414, 423(a)(1), (c)(1).
37 The current definition of disability provides:
[A]n individual . . . shall be determined to be under a disability only if his
physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not
only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education,
and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which
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ity of this test is illustrated by comparing it to the workers' compensation standard for proving disability. First, the claimant's residence does not limit the geographical area for identifying the job
39
market.3 8 Second, there are no benefits for partial disability.
Third, there is no statutory schedule mandating payment once a
particular medical impairment is proven. 4
SSA has nonetheless adopted two regulations which simplify
the determination of disability. An unemployed worker is considered totally disabled if he has worked for a long time in an unskilled job and lacks the education and training to perform a more
sedentary task. 41 The Administration has also issued a list of medical impairments that give rise to a presumption of total disability
42
unless the worker is engaged in substantial gainful activity.
4.

Social Security: ProceduralFeatures

Nonadversary procedures govern at all stages of decisionmaking. Claims are filed in a district office of SSA, 4 3 which decides
whether the claimant has insured status. 44 State agencies under
exists in the national economy. regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or
whether he would be hired if he applied for work. For purposes of the preceding
sentence . . . "work which exists in the national economy" means work which exists
in significant numbers either in the region where such individual lives or in several regions of the country.
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) (1970). Under an earlier version of this definition, many courts
found claimants disabled if they could not perform their prior jobs and were prevented
from getting another job in their locality by local employment conditions. See Dixon, The
Welfare State and MassJustice: A Warningfrom the Social Security Disability Program, 1972 DUKE
L.J. 681, 725-26. Congress amended the statute in 1968 to impose the more rigorous requirements set out above. Act of Jan. 2, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 158(b), 81 Stat. 868.
See generally Liebman, The Definition of Disability in Social Security and Supplemental Security
Income: Drawing the Bounds of Social Welfare Estates, 89 HARV. L. REV. 833 (1976).
38 FECA uses the local community as its standard. Alexander A. Mihok, 22 Emp.
Comp. App. Bd. 210, 212 (1971).
39 5 U.S.C. § 8106 (1970) provides for partial disability benefits in the FECA program.
41'5 U.S.C. § 8107 (1970) provides for schedular benefits in the FECA program.
41 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(c) (1976).
42 Id. § 404.1502(a). A dispute may also arise over whether the claimant has cooperated with the agency in accepting treatment and rehabilitation (42 U.S.C. §§ 422(b), 423
(d)(5) (1970 & Supp. V 1975)) or cooperated in obtaining evidence (20 C.F.R. § 404.1530
(1976)), both of which are conditions of eligibility.
43 Dixon, supra note 37, at 688. The regulations discussing initial administrative determinations appear at 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.905-.908 (1976).
44 In fiscal 1974, 205,120 applications were denied for technical reasons, including
failure to meet insured status and withdrawal of applications. Memorandum from Edwin
Simmons, Bureau of Disability Insurance, to William D. Popkin (July 9, 1976).
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contract with SSA make the initial determination of disability.45 To
insure quality control, the Bureau of Disability Insurance of SSA
reviews 5% of the state agencies' decisions. 46 The Bureau can also
47
deny a claim outright.
A doctor and, where available, a vocational specialist make the
initial decision. 48 The agency may arrange for consultative examinations by outside doctors; 4 9 consultation with outside vocational
specialists is also possible, but is "sporadic. '50 There is no right to a
51
hearing at this stage.
An unsuccessful claimant begins the appeal process by requesting reconsideration by the agency that made the initial decision. 52
New evidence of disability may be submitted. The process is identical to the initial stage, 53 except that the Bureau of Disability Insurance selects a 10% sample for quality control review.5 4 About 30%
of initially unsuccessful claimants seek reconsideration. 55
The claimant who loses at the reconsideration stage may take
4542 U.S.C. § 421 (1970). State agencies were expected to have close contacts with the
local medical profession. STAFF OF HOUSE CoMMat. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 93D CONG., 2D
SEss., REPORT ON THE DISABILITY INSURANCE PROGRAM 17 (Comm. Print 1974) [hereinafter
cited as STAFF REPORT]. Most of the state agencies are vocational rehabilitation agencies. Id.
46 STAFF REPORT, supra note 45, at 27-29.
4742 U.S.C. § 421(c) (1970).
48 Dixon states that the two-man team is "trained in disability evaluation." Dixon, supra
note 37, at 690. But there is considerable controversy over the availability and qualification
of vocational specialists. Some state agencies do not have any on their staffs. STAFF REPORT,
supra note 45, at 233. The specialist's training is primarily on-the-job but, in some instances, includes a course given at the central office in Baltimore. Id. at 99.
49 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (1976). This occurs in about 19% of the cases. STAFF REPORT,
supra note 45, at 229 (data for fiscal 1973).
50 STAFF REPORT,
51
52

supra note 45, at 98.

See Dixon, supra note 37, at 694.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.909-.916 (1976). Prior to 1959, such an appeal was not mandatory.

STAFF REPORT,

supra note 45, at 244.

' 3 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.902 (1976). Consultative examinations are, however, more frequent at the reconsideration stage. STAFF REPORT, supra note 45, at 229.
54 STAFF REPORT,

supra note 45, at 190.

-5 In fiscal 1974, 175,336 claims by workers were processed after a request for reconsideration and 60,393 of these were won. Memorandum from Edwin Simmons, supra note
44. The win rate appears to be declining. In fiscal 1973, 40% of the reconsideration claims
were won. STAFF REPORT, supra note 45, at 309. These reconsideration cases do not come
solely from the 621,420 fiscal 1974 denials reported for the initial stage; some 1974 appeals resulted from 1973 losses. The 30% appeal rate is therefore an approximation.
The data include determinations on grounds other than disability, such as whether the
claimant had insured status. For fiscal 1974, however, the elimination of such cases would
not affect the 34% win rate at the reconsideration level. Of the 175,336 claims, 1,683
involved nondisability issues, of which 640 were affirmed and 1,043 were reversed. Therefore, 173,653 cases involved the claimant's disability in fiscal 1974. Telephone interview
with Ms. Audrey Hawkins, Bureau of Disability Insurance (Oct. 27, 1976).
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his case to the Bureau of Hearings and Appeals, 56 which is independent of the Bureau of Disability Insurance. About 50% of the
claimants who lose at the reconsideration stage appeal to the hearing stage, 57 where new evidence is admissible 58 and an Administrative Law Judge conducts the proceedings. 59
Experts play a major role at the hearing stage. The judge may
order consultative examinations6 ° and may ask outside medical advisors and vocational experts to help interpret the record by pro61
viding live testimony or by responding to written interrogatories.
62
Vocational experts play a greater role than medical advisors.
Persevering claimants who lose at the hearing stage may carry
their cases to the Appeals Council of the Bureau of Hearings and
Appeals. 63 The decisionmakers at this level are all lawyers.6 4 An
appeal to this level is a prerequisite to judicial review, 65 but the
Council may, in its discretion, deny a request for review. 6 6 The
Appeals Council may also review allowances of claims by the
67
Bureau of Hearings and Appeals on its own motion.
68
The Council may accept new evidence in unusual cases.
56 42 U.S.C. § 421(d) (1970); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.917-.940 (1976).
'7 The 50% figure is an estimate. In fiscal 1973, 53,368 appeals by workers and dependents were processed. Memorandum from Philip W. Fensterer, Deputy Assistant
Bureau Director, Appeals Operation, Bureau of Hearings and Appeals, to William D. Popkin (July 9, 1976). The reconsideration losses numbered 94,900 in fiscal 1973 and 101,300
in fiscal 1972. STAFF REPORT, supra note 45, at 308-09. The 50% appeal rate assumes no
time lag between losing at the reconsideration stage and processing cases at the hearing
stage.
58 20 C.F.R. § 404.927 (1976).
59
Id. § 404.921.
6
Judges ordered consultative examinations in 25% of the cases in fiscal 1973. STAFF
REPORT, supra note 45, at 229.
61 The role of vocational experts and medical advisors is explained in id. at 94-98,
101-05. In fiscal 1973, there were 53,368 decisions in disability cases. Id. at 250. Medical
advisors gave written advice in 1,309 cases and live testimony in 2,622 cases. Id. at 105.
Vocational experts gave written advice in 399 cases and live testimony in 13,074 cases. Id.
at 96.
62
Id. at 96, 105.
63 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.941-.952 (1976).
64 Interview with Dale Cook, Director, Bureau of Hearings and Appeals, in Arlington,
Va. (June 26, 1973).
65 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1970).
66 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.947, .951 (1976).
67 20 C.F.R. § 404.947 (1976). The agency has ninety days to decide whether to review
a case on its own motion (id.), and the claimant has sixty days to request review (id.
§ 404.946). Some cases in which the claim is allowed may be appealed within the sixty-day
period because the claimant seeks to establish an earlier date for onset of disability.
68 The regulations provide that new evidence is admissible only if it appears to the
Appeals Council that it "may affect its decision." Id. §§ 404.943, .949.
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Outline of Decisionmaking in the
Social Security Program

Agency: State agency under contract with Bureau of Disability Insurance, Social Security Administration.
Number of claims processed: 1,034,520 (fiscal 1974).a
Percentagewon: 40%1
Appeal to: Same agency as initial stage.
Source of data: Memorandum from Edwin Simmons, supra note 44.

Agency: Same as initial stage.
Number of appeals processed: 175,336 (fiscal 1974).
Percentagewon: 34%
Appeal to: Bureau of Hearings and Appeals, Social Security Administration.
Source of data: Same as initial stage.

Agency: Bureau of Hearings and Appeals, Social Security Administration.
c
Number of appeals processed: 57,774 (fiscal 1975).
Percentagewon: 55%
Appeal to: Appeals Council, Bureau of Hearings and Appeals.
Source of data: Letter from Philip W. Fensterer, Deputy Assistant Bureau Director, Appeals Operation, Bureau of Hearings and Appeals, to William D. Popkin (Aug. 27,
1976).

Agency: Appeals Council, Bureau of Hearings and Appeals.
Number of appeals processed: 12,131 (fiscal 1975).
Percentagewon: 10%'
Appeal to: Federal courts.
Source of data: Same as prior stage.

b

d

Figures at this stage and at the reconsideration stage include only claims by workers, not
by dependents.
In 205,120 cases, claims were denied for technical reasons, including failure to meet insured status and withdrawal of applications. In addition, 416,300 claims were denied because the applicant was not disabled.
Figures for this stage and the next stage include claims by workers and dependents. An
additional 6,141 cases were dismissed for procedural reasons.
The win rate is based on the number of appeals processed, after excluding 366 cases dismissed for procedural reasons. The Appeals Council exercised its discretion to deny review in 10,218 cases; these cases are shown as losses on the chart. Claimants won 65%
of the 1,913 cases appealed and reviewed on the merits.
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Hearings are held only in those extraordinary cases that the Council has ordered removed from the hearing stage.6 9 The Council has
discretion to allow oral argument. 70 The claimant may appeal to
the federal courts if the Appeals Council denies the appeal or
refuses to review the case.
5.

Veterans Disability Program: Substantive Features

Veterans suffer from none of the stigmas associated with the
"welfare poor."' 7 1 Veterans are considered to have "earned" government benefits.72 This attitude accounts for the provisions giving
veterans the benefit of the doubt in disability cases.73
The core of the Veterans disability program is the Rating
Schedule, which converts almost all vocational disputes into medical ones. 74 This schedule is far more elaborate than workers' compensation schedules, 7 5 and covers almost all medical impairments.
Each medical condition is deemed to cause a specified percentage
reduction in wage-earning capacity, and benefits are provided by
76
statute accordingly.
The Rating Schedule is used in two separate benefit
programs-the Compensation program and the Pension program. 77 The Compensation program covers only "serviceconnected" disabilities. 78 Impairments are gauged in 10% inter"9 Id. § 404.941 (1976).
70 The regulations do not provide for oral argument. Id. § 404.948. But see Dixon,
supra7 note 37, at 698 n.79 (oral argument may be allowed).
1See generally G. STEINER, supra note 27, at 237-79; PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON
VETERANS' PENSIONS, VETERANS' BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES 33-61 (1956).
712See Inhabitants of Veazie v. Inhabitants of China, 50 Me. 518 (1864).
73

E.g., 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 4.3 (1976).
See 38 U.S.C. § 355 (1970); 38 C.F.R. §§ 4.1-.150 (1976). From 1925 to 1933, an
effort was made to determine actual loss of wage-earning capacity, but veterans' lack of
civilian job experience made this very difficult. DEP'T OF VETERANS BENEFITS, VETERANS
74

ADMINISTRATION, ECONOMIC VALIDATION OF THE RATING SCHEDULE ch. 2 (1971).

"5The submergence of individual differences into uniform categories has been defended as follows: "[A] mass compensation program cannot be administered by attempting
judgment in each case .... A social insurance program cannot be turned into a judicial
system." 1 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON VETERANS' PENSIONS, STAFF REPORT VIII, VETERANS' BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES 242 (1956).
76 38 U.S.C. §§ 314, 334 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). In the Pension program, the claimant
must be totally disabled, and benefits are based on need. Id. § 521.
77
1d. §§ 301-362 (Compensation), 501-562 (Pension). The regulations covering both

programs are in 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.1-4.150 (1976).
78 38 U.S.C. §§ 331, 353 (1970). "Service-connection" means that the impairment is
incurred or aggravated while the claimant is in the service. There is no requirement that
the impairment be work-connected. Id. However, the disability cannot arise from misconduct. Id. §§ 310, 331.
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vals,7 9 and most fall in the 10-20% range. 80 Service-connection
may be the hardest fact for the claimant to prove. 8 '
The Pension program helps needy veterans who become totally and permanently disabled from a nonservice-connected disability. 82 There are no benefits for partial disability, but the program's standards of "unemployability" give benefits to many
veterans who would not meet the "total disability" standards used
in other programs. 83
Under both the Compensation and Pension programs a veteran is considered totally disabled if he is "unemployable" 84 and
achieves a certain percentage disability under the Rating Schedule.8 5 The definition of "unemployability" is somewhat hazy,8 6 but

apparently an unemployed claimant is often assumed to be
unemployable.87 Claimants may also establish "extra-schedular"
loss of wage-earning capacity under standards similar to workers'

compensation programs.88 Extra-schedular cases are rare,

9

how-

ever, and officials superior to those who determine ratings must

approve the awards. 90

9Id. § 355.
"0PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON VETERANS' PENSIONS, supra note 71, at 175-77. My sample data confirm this. Of 102 cases in which a compensation claim under the rating
schedule was allowed, 51 were for 10% and 23 were for 20%. Claimants often try to prove
that an impairment is service-connected, even though the impairment has a zero percent
rating. If the impairment later worsens, the veteran may then be entided to compensation.
1 M. Gilhooley, Veterans' Administration Disability Procedure 18 (Mar. 8, 1972) (unpublished manuscript prepared for the Administrative Conference of the United States)
[hereinafter cited as Gilhooley-Veterans].
82 38 U.S.C. § 521 (Supp. V 1975). The disability cannot arise from misconduct. Id.
§ 521(a).
83 See note 37 and text accompanying note 13 supra.
8438 C.F.R. §§ 3.340-.341, 4.16-.17 (1976).
" The Rating Schedule percentage that must be achieved before unemployability can
be proven varies between the Compensation and Pension programs. See id.§§ 4.16-.17. In
the Pension program, a needy veteran aged 65 is eligible regardless of disability. 38 U.S.C.
§ 502(a) (Supp. V 1975).
86 The regulations dealing with "unemployability" vary inexplicably between the Compensation and Pension programs. The Compensation definition is "unable to secure or
follow a substantially gainful occupation." 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(a) (emphasis added). The Pension
program definition is "unable to secure and follow a substantially gainful occupation." Id.
§ 4.17 (emphasis added).
87 Interview with Thomas A. Verrill, Adjudication Officer, Indianapolis field office, in
Indianapolis, Ind. (July 30, 1973).
"'See 38 C.F.R. § 3.321(b) (1976).
88 My data show 1% of the sample cases (N=399) at the initial stage won on this
ground. See Chart 8 infra, at note a.
9 38 C.F.R. § 3.321(b) (1976).
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Veterans Disability Program: ProceduralFeatures

Compensation and Pension claims are processed by over fifty
field offices of the Veterans Administration. The proceedings are
nonadversary at all stages.9 1 Disability decisions are made by Rating
Boards of three members. Each Board includes a doctor and a
legal specialist; the third member may be either a legal or occupational specialist. 92 The Board examines the claimant's medical
records from the service, and may order further medical examinations. These are usually performed by Veterans Administration
doctors, unless the claimant is bed-ridden or incarcerated. 93 The
medical member of the Board may also examine the claimant if the
94
claimant consents. Hearings before the Rating Board are rare.
If the claimant is dissatisfied with the Rating Board decision,
he may appeal to the Board of Veterans Appeals, which is part of
the Veterans Administration but independent of its field offices. 95
The claimant initiates the appeal by filing a Notice of Disagreement. The Notice insures reconsideration of the case by, and the
opportunity to present new evidence to, the field office that made
the initial decision. If the prior decision is reaffirmed, the agency
sends the claimant a Statement of the Case explaining in detail the
reasons for the decision. 96 The claimant may then submit further
evidence, which leads to yet another reconsideration by the field
office.
If still unsuccessful, the claimant may then appeal to the
Board of Veterans Appeals. The Board sits in three-member
panels which, in disability cases, consist of a doctor and two
lawyers. 9 7 The Board has available a staff of medical specialists,
and can call on doctors outside the agency for advice. 98 The claim91 There is a provision for agency appeal to resolve field office conflicts (id. § 19.123),

but it is used in "tp]robably less than 100 [cases] in a year." Gilhooley-Veterans, supra note
81, at 34.
92 Gilhooley-Veterans, supra note 81, at 21 (legal specialists "often, but not always,"
lawyers).
93 Interview with Thomas A. Verrill, supra note 87.
94 Gilhooley-Veterans, supra note 81, at 21-22.
9' The Board of Veterans Appeals is authorized by 38 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4009 (1970) and
38 C.F.R §§ 19.1-.156 (1976).
96 38 U.S.C. § 4005(d) (1970).
:7 Gilhooley-Veterans, supra note 81, at 28.
" 38 U.S.C. § 4009 (1970). Formal consultation with outside specialists occurred in 298
cases in fiscal 1973. ADMINISTRATOR OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, ANNUAL REPORT 99 (1973). The
Board uses a staff of attorneys to help conduct hearings and prepare opinions. GilhooleyVeterans, supra note 81, at 29; Interview with Woodrow A. Baumgardner, Special Assistant
to the Chairman of the Board of Veterans Appeals, in Washington, D.C. (June 22, 1973).

1977]

NONADVERSARY REPRESENTATION

1005

ant can submit new evidence to the Board,9 9 but this will almost

always result in a remand to the field office. Therefore, new evidence is usually submitted to the field office prior to the appeal. 10 0
No cross-examination is allowed at the hearings, 10 1 and there is no
2
judicial review of disability decisions.10
CHART

3

Outline of Decisionmaking in the Veterans Program

Agency: Field offices of Veterans Administration.
Number of claims processed: Data not maintained by agency.
Percentagewon: Estimated at 40% for Compensation claims and 80-90% for Pension
claims.
Appeal to: Board of Veterans Appeals.
Source of data: Gilhooley-Veterans, supra note 81, at 25.

--

Field office of Veterans Administration: Reconsiders claim when appeal is taken.
a
Number of cases settled infield: 28,618 (fiscal 1973).
Percentageof cases settled without Board hearing: 34%b
Source of data: ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 98, a 99.

Agency: Board of Veterans Appeals.
Number of appeals processed: 29,551 (fiscal 1973).a
Percentagewon: 31%c
Appeal to: No judicial review.
Source of data: ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 98, at 99.

a Notice of disagreement was filed in 50,381 cases, but field office reconsideration settled
about one-half of these cases. Over 75% of appeals are in disability cases.
b The remaining 66% were either withdrawn or not followed up by an appeal.
c The win rate is based on cases processed on the merits. Appeal was withdrawn in 274 cases
in which the appeal had been perfected. Wins include remands; 54% of the wins were remands by the Board.
99 38 C.F.R. §§ 19.141-.142 (1976).
'00 Gilhooley-Veterans, supra note 81, at 29.
The Board gives the claimant an opportunity for a hearing either in Washington,
D.C., or near the claimant's residence. A hearing near the claimant's residence may be held
either by a traveling section of the Board or by a Rating Board which will mail the transcript to the Board of Veterans Appeals. 38 C.F.R. § 19.138 (1976). In fiscal 1973, there
were a total of 971 hearings, of which 365 were held by traveling sections of the Board
and 33 by field offices. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 98, at 99.
101 38 C.F.R. § 19.133(c) (1976).
102 38 U.S.C. § 211 (1970).
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B.

Summary of Nonadversary Procedures
Decisionmaking procedures in the agencies studied share two
characteristics. First, their purpose is to insure fairness to the
claimant. Second, they are designed to allocate the agency's workload efficiently.
1. Fairness
All three agencies studied take three steps to insure fairness
and the appearance of fairness. First, the decisionmaker may consult outside experts as well as agency experts. 10 3 This reduces both
the chances and charges that expert advisors are biased against the
claimant. Second, at least one stage of appeal involves review by0 a4
body independent of the agency initially deciding the claim.
This is especially important when judicial review is not allowed or
limited in scope. Third, the decisionmaking process includes at
some point an evidentiary hearing. t0 5
2. Efficient Design of Decisionmaking
Decisionmaking procedures should be no more complex than
necessary to decide effectively the issues presented. As Chart 4 indicates, the agencies studied vary in the training of decisionmakers
and in the opportunity for a hearing at different stages. The initial
and reconsideration stages are dominated by doctors almost to the
exclusion of lawyers,' 10 6 and decisions usually rest on the written
117r

record.

After the earlier stages, the agencies provide an opportunity
for a hearing and, with one exception, a final administrative review
stage. Lawyers dominate these final two stages, almost to the exclusion of doctors. 18 The hearing stage allows the claimant and the
103 Advice

from experts outside the agency is available at every stage of the FECA and

Social Security programs, except the final administrative review stage. See text accompanying notes 21, 26, 49, 60, & 61 supra. In the Veterans program, Veterans Administration
doctors are used at the initial stage, but outside experts are available at the Board of
Veterans Appeals stage. See text accompanying notes 93 & 98 supra.
104 See text accompanying notes 28, 56, & 95 supra.
105See text accompanying notes 24, 27 (FECA), 56-58 (Social Security), & 99-100 (Veterans) supra.
106 See text accompanying notes 48 (Social Security) & 92 (Veterans; one of three decisionmakers may be a lawyer) supra. In the FECA program, the decisionmakers typically
are neither doctors nor lawyers. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
1017
See text accompanying notes 22 (FECA), 51 (Social Security), & 94 (Veterans) supra.
100 See text accompanying notes 29 (FECA), 64 (Social Security), & 97 (Veterans) supra.
Only in the Social Security program are the judges required to be lawyers, since the hear-
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decisionmaker to meet face-to-face, in order to present and discuss
the evidence. The final administrative review stage may also provide an opportunity for oral argument. 0 9

CHART 4

Summary of ProceduralFeaturesby DecisionmakingStage and Program

DecisionmakingStage
and Program
1. Initial Stage
a. FECA
b. Social Security
c. Veterans
2. Reconsideration Stage
a. FECA
b. Social Security
c. Veterans
3. Hearing Stage
a. FECA
b. Social Security
c. Veterans
4. Final Administrative
Review Stage
a. FECA
b. Social Security
c. Veterans

Trainingof Decisionmaker
Doctor
Lawyer

Right to a
Hearing

No
Yes
Yes a

No
No
Often a

No
No
Rare

Yes
Yes a

No
Oftena

No
Rare

No
No
Yes,

No
Yes
Yesc

Yes
Yes
Yes

No
No
N/App

Yes
Yes
N/App

d
d

N/App

N/App=Not Applicable

a

One of the three decisionmakers is often a lawyer. No data on the percentage of lawyers
are available.
Review by DHR is classified as a hearing stage, although it also has features of a recon-

sideration stage, since the decisionmakers are not lawyers and are part of the agency
(OWCP) that decides the initial claim. But this stage is classified as a hearing stage because
the judges conduct hearings, are not doctors, and hold positions in the National Office
of OWCP that make them independent of the field offices.
c Two of the three decisionmakers are lawyers and one is a doctor.
d The Appeals Council of SSA does not usually allow hearings at this stage. Oral argument
is a matter of right in the FECA program, and is allowed in the agency's discretion in the
Social Security program.

ings are governed by the Administrative Procedure Act. See text accompanying note 59
supra.
109 Oral argument is a matter of right in the FECA program (see text accompanying
note 31 supra), but is only granted in the tribunal's discretion in the Social Security program (see note 70 and accompanying text supra).

1008

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:989

The tension between efficiency and fairness is most apparent
at the reconsideration stage. Review by the same personnel using
the same procedures as the initial stage would be redundant. But
an opportunity for a hearing at the reconsideration stage may
make the process unduly complicated at too early a point in the
decisionmaking process. Providing fair and efficient reconsideration remains the most challenging task for administrators designing nonadversary procedures." 0
C. Rules Affecting Representation
The agencies in this study neither prohibit nor encourage representation; for example, they neither pay for free counsel in all
cases nor pay the fees of winning counsel. In some instances, however, agencies send notices to claimants that could discourage them
from seeking the advice of counsel."'
In addition, certain rules affect the availability of representation, even though that may not be their purpose. First, the government seeks to protect income maintenance claimants by requir2
ing that any counsel fee be approved by the responsible agency."1
The effect of this rule on the availability of counsel is uncertain. It
may discourage representatives from taking cases; it may, however,
encourage claimants to seek representation by eliminating fear of
exorbitant fees. 1 3 Second, some agencies help representatives collect fees by paying them directly out of past-due awards."14 This
probably encourages counsel to take cases, since the representative
need not fear that his client will fail to pay the fee.
1I The Social Security reconsideration stage illustrates this problem. See discussion in

notes 160-63 and accompanying text infra.
" See notes 116, 120, 127, and accompanying text infra.
12
' See notes 118, 123, & 127 infra.
" The demand for lawyers is highly elastic, and influenced by price. B. CHRISTENSEN,
LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE MEANS 38 (1970). Assurance of reasonable fees should
therefore increase claimants' demand for counsel.
Some have suggested that the practice of approving lawyers' fees has discouraged
counsel from appearing in Social Security cases. See STAFF REPORT, supra note 45, at
430-32; Viles, The Social Security Administration Versus the Lawyers .. . and Poor People Too (pt.
2), 40 Miss. L.J. 24, 73-74 (1968); Yarowsky, Attorneys' Fees in Social Security Proceedings: A
Criticism of the Official Restrictive Design, 17 U. KAN. L. REV. 79-85 (1968). However, no such
effect has been observed in Black Lung cases. STAFF REPORT, supra note 45, at 432. Viles
notes a 19% appearance rate for lawyers at the Social Security hearing stage from January
1966 to July 1967 (Viles, supra at 74-75 n.330), while my sample data show a 33% (N=
419) appearance rate from June through November 1974. See generally The Effect of Legal
Fees on the Adequacy of Representation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Representation of Citizen

Interests of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
, 4 See notes 118, 123, & text accompanying note 127 infra.
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1. FECA
15
Claimants may be represented by any person they choose."
An applicant for benefits receives the following notice: "Does an
employee need an attorney or other representative in order to file
a claim for compensation? This is not necessary; however, he may,
if he so desires, employ an attorney or other person to represent
him."' 1 6 The phrasing of this notice may subtly discourage the use
of counsel, even though the agency erects no obstacles.
The notice informing the claimant of the initial decision in his
case does not discourage the use of counsel on appeal, although
there is no active encouragement. The claimant is simply told that
he "may be represented at the hearing by any person authorized
.. in writing."' " 7 However, a representative may not collect a fee
18
unless it is approved by the agency.
2. Social Security
Claimants may be represented by anyone;"19 however, no
mention of the right to representation is made in any form
routinely given to claimants who apply for benefits. If a claimant
asks about representation, he is given a form suggesting that it may
not be necessary:
You have the right to be represented by a person of your
choice in any business you might have with the Social Security
Administration.
This does not mean that you will need a representative. Most
people handle their social security affairs themselves with the
help of the people in the social security office.
If you wish to be represented, however, the people in your
social security office will be glad to work with your representative
20
just as they would work with you.'
1155 U.S.C. § 8127(a) (1970); 20 C.F.R. §§ 10.142-.143 (1976).
116 EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION,

U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FEDERAL INJURY

COMPENSATION 7 (rev. ed. 1973).
117 Form FL-48 (rev. July 1968) (form sent to claimant at end of initial stage).

118 5 U.S.C. § 8127(b) (1970). The agency does not pay the fee directly to the representative out of the award. Counsel might be encouraged to appear more often if they
could be confident of collecting their fees. See Hearings on S. 1522 Before the Subcomm. on
Administrative Practiceand Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciay, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
5-7 (1966).
119 42 U.S.C. § 406(a) (1970); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.971-.972 (1976).
120 Social Security Administration, Dep't of HEW, Form SSI-75, Social Security and
Your Right to Representation (Sept. 1970). The Claims Manual, distributed to Social Security Administration employees in the district offices, states:
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A claimant who loses at the initial stage receives a booklet
describing his right to appeal, which states: "You have a right to be
represented by a qualified person of your choice in dealing with
the Social Security Administration at any stage of your claim.' 2 1
The notice of a right to appeal to the hearing stage also states that
representation is allowed, without discouraging the use of counsel:
"If you wish, you may be represented by an attorney or by any
other individual."'122 A representative may not collect a fee, how23
ever, unless the agency determines that it is reasonable.
3.

Veterans

Claimants may choose anyone to represent them. 1 24 As a practical matter, representation is limited to non-attorneys working
for recognized veterans organizations, since fees may not exceed
$10.1 25 The statute also authorizes service organizations to rep26
resent applicants if they do so free of charge.
The agency's notice to claimants reflects this pattern of
representation. The application for Compensation and Pension
benefits states:
Advising Claimant on Right to Representation-Ifa beneficiary or claimant merely
expresses an interest in possibly appointing a representative, give him an SSI-75
"Right to Representation" booklet ....
• . . Generally a claimant should be neither encouraged to have or [sic] discouraged from having a representative.
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEP'T OF HEW, SOCIAL SECURITY CLAIMS MANUAL, pt.
3, § 3505 (Nov. 1970) [hereinafter cited as CLAIMS MANUAL].
121 Social Security Administration, Dep't of HEW, Form SSI-58, Your Right to Question the Decision Made on Your Claim (Oct. 1970).
122 Social Security Administration, Dep't of HEW, Form BHA-1, Right to Appeal (Mar.
1969).
123 42 U.S.C. § 406(a) (1970). The statute refers only to attorneys, but the regulations
refer to any representative. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.975(b) (1976). The agency will help an
attorney collect a reasonable fee by paying him directly up to 25% of a past-due award. 42
U.S.C. § 406(a) (1970); 20 C.F.R. § 404.975(b) (1976). This is not a ceiling on the amount
of the fee. However, there is a ceiling of 25% of past-due benefits for representation in
court. 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1) (1970).
124 38 U.S.C. §8 3402-3404 (1970). This choice is subject, however, to statutory
guidelines and to approval by the Administrator. Id. §§ 3401-3404.
25
1 Id. § 3404(c)(2). These fee limits do not violate a claimant's due process and equal
protection rights. Gendron v. Saxbe, 389 F. Supp. 1303 (C.D. Cal.), aff'd mem., 423 U.S.
802 (1975). An attorney in private practice might accept such a case as a favor to a client
or in connection with other disability litigation likely to result in a larger fee. Legal Aid
offices are not discouraged by lack of a fee, but they have not taken up a large number of
veterans' cases. My sample shows no lawyers at the initial stage and five lawyers, including one legal aid lawyer, at the Board of Veterans Appeals stage (N=214).
116 38 U.S.C. § 3402 (1970); 38 C.F.R. § 14.626 (1976). The Veterans Administration
may provide free office space to these organizations. 38 U.S.C. § 3402(a)(2) (1970).
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You may be represented, without charge, by an accredited
representative of any organization recognized by the Administrator of Veterans Affairs. While a claimant may also employ an
attorney or claims agent recognized by the Veterans Administration to assist him in prosecuting his claim, it is not necessary that
he do so. Any attorney or agent so employed may not legally
charge any fee other than that allowed and paid by the Veterans
Administration, and which is deducted from benefits otherwise
7
12

payable to the claimant.

This notice indirectly discourages representation by attorneys,
since it states that attorney fees will be deducted from an award
without noting that the fees are limited to $10.
The form used to perfect an appeal to the Board of Veterans
Appeals is neutral on the use of representatives: "A claimant may
be represented in the presentation of his claim by a recognized
service organization provided a proper power of attorney is fur-

CHART 5

Summary of Rules Affecting Representation

DiscouragingRepresentation

Program

Restrictive
Fee limitsa

EncouragingRepresentation

Fee Paid
Out of
Award

Free counsel,
or counsel
cost-free
to winning
claimant

Prohibition

Notice

FECA

No

b

No

No

No

Social
Security

No

I

No

Yese

No

Veterans

No

C

Yesd

Yes

I The agency must approve the reasonableness of fees in all three programs.
b Notice discourages representation only at the initial stage. In Social Security, information
on representation does not have to be given to the claimant at the initial stage unless he
asks about representation.
c Notice discourages attorneys but does not discourage representation.
d The fee limit is $10.
e This is done only for attorneys.
f Service organizations provide free representation, and the government provides free office space to all recognized service organizations that request it.

127 Form VA 21-526 (Aug. 1972).
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nished, or by an attorney provided a proper declaration of representation is furnished."' 2
II
DESIGN OF THE STUDY

A.

Selecting the Sample
Accessibility of data dictated the choice of program stages for
study. 12 9 The problems of obtaining data also required a crosssectional approach-selecting cases from each stage of decisionmaking without examining what happened to those cases at other
stages-rather than a longitudinal approach-analyzing decisions
in particular cases as they flow through the decisionmaking process. A longitudinal study proved unmanageable because of the
complex organization of the agencies involved. 3 a° Time constraints
Form VA 1-9 (May 1973).
For example, the initial stage of the FECA program was not studied because problems would have been encountered in extracting meaningful data from the agency's files.
Claimants in the FECA program often make claims for different types of benefits, and, as
a result, a large number of documents are presented by the claimant and gathered by the
agency to explore the merits of the various claims. A review of the files to determine the
issues actually disputed and how the disputes were resolved would have been too timeconsuming. At the hearing and final administrative review stages, however, disputes usually focus on one or two important issues; therefore, those stages were included in the
study. See also Chart 6 infra, at notes b & c.
1I An "agency" is really a number of agencies, each of which is concerned only with
its own stage of decisionmaking. Thus, studying a case as it flowed through the system
would have involved obtaining the cooperation of scores of agency workers. Therefore, the
study was unable to determine whether representation at one stage made a difference in
appeal rate to a later stage. In one instance, however, longitudinal data were obtained. Data
compiled by SSA's Bureau of Hearings and Appeals on the rate of appeals from the hearing stage to the appeals council surprisingly indicate that represented claimants did not
appeal more frequently than unrepresented claimants.
128
129

Effect of Representation on Appeal Rates
from Social Security Hearing Stage
Appeal % (N)
No representative

32

(158)

Representative

28

( 80)

31

(238)

Significance
Confidence interval for
representative's tendency
to appeal

NS)

(-14, + 6)
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also limited the number of cases studied. 131
B.

Meaning and Relevance of Variables

The following variables were considered in analyzing the effect of representation on agency decisions.
1. Representation
In determining whether the claimant had counsel, it was sometimes possible to identify the representative as an attorney or nonattorney. Thus, even if representation in general brought no advantage at a program stage, it could occasionally be determined
that a particular type of representative helped the claimant.
2. Results
Results were classified as either a win or loss whenever the
agency made a final disposition. 1 32 In the FECA hearing and final
administrative review stages, where remands are possible, remands
were recorded as "wins."133
3. Procedures Used by Claimant: Hearing Requests, Hearings
Held, New Evidence Presented by Claimant
It is important to know whether represented claimants are
more likely than unrepresented claimants to insist on various pro131Any future study of decisionmaking processes may benefit from the following
warnings concerning the difficulty of obtaining data. First, agencies do not usually maintain records for the purpose of understanding the decisionmaking process. Their major
concerns are managing their workload and, in some instances, understanding the population affected by the program. Data relevant to an understanding of decisionmaking could
therefore be buried in untabulated form in case opinions. When the information is tabulated, it still may not provide a complete picture of the decisionmaking process, and other
parts of the file may have to be consulted. Second, compiling the data can present special
problems, since they may have to be gathered from offices throughout the country. Third,
some information may have to be deleted to preserve confidentiality. Finally, the enormity
of an agency's workload may result in considerable delays in obtaining raw data.
132 A win on appeal in the programs studied should not be confused with a reversal by
a judicial tribunal of a trial court decision. Except at the final administrative review stage
of the FECA program, new evidence is admissible in all program stages for which data
were gathered. However, to the extent that the claimant's win on appeal is the result of
evidence overlooked at an earlier stage, or is the result of a shift in perspective at a later
stage of administrative decisionmaking, the agency can be held responsible for the earlier
loss, and a win is more analogous to a reversal by a court of appeals.
133 An alternative would be to omit these remands entirely. This would understate the
claimants' win rate, however, since remands generally operate as signals to lower level decisionmakers that litigants have a strong case. The Employees' Compensation Appeals
Board apparently adopts this view, because the agency counts remands as wins. GilhooleyFECA, supra note 17, at table 4. See Chart I supra, at note e.
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cedures in the decisionmaking process. Agencies generally believe
that representation encourages formalized procedures, and consider this an argument against encouraging counsel; such procedures, they claim, are costly and unnecessary. 134 In addition, a
comparison of the way cases are pursued by represented and unrepresented claimants may indicate how representatives help
claimants win.
4. Agency's Use of Outside Experts
This variable was examined to see if experts were biased toward claimants. 13 5
5.

Type of Issue

When it was possible to identify which issues regularly arose in
the decisionmaking process, the data were analyzed to see if the
effect of representation varied with the central issue in a case. It
was not possible, however, to determine whether an issue was intrinsically easy or difficult to win on. 3 6 This problem may not be
a serious shortcoming. First, even if representatives handled cases
that were intrinsically easy to win, counsel may have helped the
claimant by urging him to press his claim. Second, the evidence
suggests that representatives take both hard and easy cases. If representatives took only easy cases, they should be associated primarily with winning claims; this is not the situation. 13 7 Third, the representative may not know whether a case is hard or easy until he
38
has accepted it and investigated the facts.1
C. Methodology
Each variable is divided into alternate categories. For example,
the independent variable "representation" consists of "no repre134See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
135Cf. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 413-14 (1971) (dissenting opinion, Douglas,
J.) (objectivity of HEW's "stable of defense doctors" challenged).
136An experiment could be designed in which a panel of experts would rate cases as
"easy" or "hard" to win. After being distributed among represented and unrepresented
claimants, the cases would be observed as they went through the decisionmaking process.
Use of actual claimants for this experiment, however, would be unfair to some of them,

and passing simulated cases through an agency's decisionmaking process might present
difficulty. One alternative would be to simulate both the cases and the decisionmaking

process.
13 7 See Table IA infra.
138Once an attorney has investigated a claim, it would be considered unprofessional
for him to withdraw. See ABA, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-11 G(C).
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sentative/representative," "attorney/non-attorney," "no representative/type of representative," and the "result" variable is "win/
lose." A comparison of the percentage of wins for one alternative
(unrepresented claimants, for example) with the percentage of
wins for the other alternative (represented claimants, for example)
indicates the effect being in one category rather than the other has
on the claimant's chances of winning a case.
The study used the difference of proportions test,13 9 which
indicates when a correlation between two variables (for example,
representation and results) in the sample reflects a difference in
the total population from which the sample was drawn. For example, if samples are small enough, a substantial difference in the win
rates between represented and unrepresented claimants might not,
by itself, prove that represented claimants are more likely to prevail.
This study treats any difference in the sample significant at a
.10 level as a real difference in the total population. To use a .10
level means that a real difference in the total population from
which the sample was drawn is deemed to exist even though there
40
is a one in ten chance that no such difference exists.'
Although the difference of proportions test determines the
likelihood of a difference existing between two groups in the total
population, it does not prove that this variation found in the sample is the exact one to be found in the total population. For every
significance level there is a range above and below the difference
found in the sample, known as the "confidence interval," within
MFor

a more detailed explanation of the difference of proportions test, see J.

SCHEUSSLER, & H. COSTNER, STATISTICAL REASONING IN SOCIOLOGY 429-31
(1970).
140More demanding significance levels are used more frequently. But see Skipper,
Guenther, & Nass, The Sacredness of .05: A Note Concerning the Uses of Statistical Levels of
Significance in Social Science, 2 AM. Soc. 16 (1967), in which the authors suggest that it is
often unduly restrictive in sociological studies to set significance levels too high.
This study reports the significance levels for all relationships significant at the .10 level
or better for several reasons. First, others may not consider the .10 level high enough;
reporting the significance levels in this study allows them to draw independent conclusions.
Second, if inequities do exist, certain remedies may be called for only if the degree of
certainty is greater than .10. For example, providing free counsel to all claimants would
involve significant costs; the government should not have to bear these costs unless there
are serious inequities in the current system. Third, relationships between variables other
than "representation/results" may call for a significance level other than .10. Rather than
shifting significance levels, this study reports findings as significant, reveals the significance
level, and lets the reader decide whether another level might be more appropriate for
analyzing the data.
MUELLER,

K.
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which the real difference might fall. For example, where the difference between indicated chances of success for represented and
unrepresented claimants equals 20% (e.g., 70% minus 50%), the
confidence interval might be (+5%, +35%) or (+15%, +25%), indicating that the real difference in the population might lie in nine
out of ten instances between 5% and 35% or, more narrowly, between 15% and 25%. This report presents these confidence intervals because they provide policymakers with the widest and
narrowest estimates of the difference in the total population.
D. Specific Program Samples
1. FECA
a. Hearing Stage. In fiscal 1973 OWCP held 599 FECA hearings. The study includes all cases decided on the merits during
May, June, and July 1973, a total of 136. Agency data show a win
rate, counting remands as wins, of
70%, 141 compared to a 65% win
42
rate in the three-month sample.'
The data were gathered from file folders maintained by the
Division of Hearings and Review.1 43 Data for presentation of new
evidence and use of outside experts are omitted when the issue is
purely legal. This distinction is lacking in the studies of other agencies. The most prominent "legal" issue at the FECA hearing stage is
whether a particular type of activity gave rise to an injury "in the
performance of duty"; this issue does not arise in other programs.
b. FinalAdministrative Review Stage. The sample consists of all
206 cases decided on the merits by the Employees' Compensation
Appeals Board in fiscal 1971 and 1972. The agency's data for fiscal
141Office of Federal Employees' Compensation, Fiscal Year Report of Division of
Hearings and Review (July 31, 1973).
142See Chart 7 infra.

143Source of information by variable analyzed:
Variable

1. Representation:

2. Results:

Source

Correspondence on file, which indicates whether the claimant had a representative. Also, notations in the address
indicate the type of representative.
Hearing examiners' recommendation
memoranda and correspondence with
the claimant.

3. Presentation of new evidence, Request for hearing, Hearing held,
Use of outside experts, Issues:

Recommendation memoranda

19771

NONADVERSARY REPRESENTATION

1017

1971 show a 27% win rate, 4 4 compared to the sample's 28% win
rate.14 5 The data are contained in the published opinions and in
46
docket cards at the Board's office in Washington, D.C.'
2. Social Security
a. ReconsiderationStage. The sample consists of 2,163 cases involving disputes over whether the claimant was disabled or over
the time his disability began. 147 All cases involved insured workers.
The study sample was 100% of the quality control sample processed
by the Bureau of Disability Insurance during part of May, all of
June, and part of July 1974.148 Agency data show a 34% win rate
144See Chart 1 supra.

145 See Chart 7 infra. Three cases decided by the Board in fiscal 1971 and 1972 were
omitted from the sample: Irwin E. Goldman, 23 Empl. Comp. App. Bd. 46 (1971) (petition
for reconsideration); Robert G. Anderson, 22 Empl. Comp. App. Bd. 151 (1971) (dispute
over attorneys' fees); Wesley Tillery, 22 Empl. Comp. App. Bd. 73 (1970) (dispute over
attorneys' fees).
146Source of information by variable analyzed:
Variable
1. Representation:

2. Results, Requests for oral argument,
Oral argument held, Issues:

Source
Docket cards, which indicate the presence or absence of a representative.
Notations in the address indicate the
type of representative.
Case opinion.

147Eighteen cases were omitted because the representative was not identified. Another

15 cases in which a friend or relative represented the claimant were omitted from analysis
of the data, except for the tabulation of representatives. This isolated those cases where an
attorney appeared at the initial decisionmaking stage, and allowed a comparison with the
Veterans initial stage, where only non-attorneys appeared. The inclusion of cases where
friends and relatives represented the claimant would have had virtually no effect on the
data.
148 This is a 10% sample, achieved by using the ninth digit of claimants' social security
numbers. Letter from Francis J. Cullen, Bureau of Disability Insurance, Social Security
Administration, to William D. Popkin (Jan. 20, 1975). There were 173,653 disability cases
processed during fiscal 1974 (see note 55 supra), of which the study's sample constitutes
approximately 1.2%.
Source of information by variable analyzed:
Variable
1. Representation:

2. Results, Use of outside experts:
3. Issues:

Source
Determined by the agency from the
case file and noted by prearranged code
on forms SSA-2506 and SSA-2506R.
Forms SSA-2506 and SSA-2506R.
This variable was omitted, since form
SSA-2506R supplied information on
the issue for only one-half of the cases.

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

1018

[Vol. 62:989

for fiscal 1974,149 compared to a 23% win rate in the three-month
sample.' 50 This smaller win rate may be due to monthly variations
in win rates or to a decline in the claimants' win rate toward the
51
end of the time period sampled.1
b. HearingStage. The sample consists of 419 cases 1 52 randomly
selected from those decided between June and September 1974.153
Only cases involving a dispute over whether the claimant was disabled or over the time disability began were selected. The agency's
data for fiscal 1975 show a 55% win rate, 15 4 compared to the sample win rate of 58%.155
The cases in the hearing stage sample were also studied to see
whether representation affected the appeal rate. The agency pro-

149See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
150 See Chart 7 infra.
151 In the prior year, the win rate was 40% (N= 146,600). STAFF REPORT, supra note 45,
at 308-09.
152The agency determined that a sample of 421 cases would provide a 90% confidence rate. Memorandum from Hallet A. Duncan, Chief, Management Information and
Appraisal Staff, Bureau of Hearings and Appeals, to Edwin W. Semans, Jr., Assistant
Bureau Director, Bureau of Hearings and Appeals (May 10, 1974). Two of the cases involving the question of insured status were discarded.
153The random selection process involved using the terminal digits one, five, and nine
of claimants' social security numbers. Not all cases decided during the sample period were
in the pool from which the selection was made. The agency recommended this procdure
because win rates do not vary more than 1% from month to month. Id.
154This win rate is based on 57,774 cases decided on the merits, of which claimants
won 31,988. An additional 6,141 cases were dismissed. Letter from Philip W. Fensterer,
supra note 57.
15- See Chart 7 infra.
Source of information by variable analyzed:
Variable
1. Representation:

2. Results, Request for hearing,
Hearing held, Use of outside experts:
3. Presentation of new evidence:
4. Issues:

Source
Determined by the agency from its case
file and noted by prearranged code on
form HA-503.
Form HA-503.
List of exhibits attached to the case
opinion.
Case opinions (using the agency's "basis
of decision" code).

Note that "Use of outside experts" refers to medical advisors and vocational experts, not
those giving consultive examinations.
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vided this data for all cases in which the sixty-day appeal period
had expired. Data on representation only identify the presence of
not whether counsel was
counsel at the hearing stage, however,
1 56
consulted on the decision to appeal.
3.

Veterans

a. Initial Stage. The sample consists of 399 cases15 7 -276
claims under the Compensation program and 123 claims for
Pension program benefits. In all cases the claimants sought cash
awards for an alleged disability. Drug abuse cases and cases
involving special cash awards for household assistance were excluded, as were claims for payment of in-kind hospitalization
benefits. All but six cases involved a dispute over the degree of
disability or whether the disability was service-connected. One
observer estimates a 40% win rate in Compensation cases and
an 80-90% win rate in Pension cases; 1 58 the one-week sample
shows a 47% win rate in Compensation cases and an 81% win
rate in Pension cases.

156 Data on the effect of representation on the rate of appeal appear in note 130 supra.

W57
The sample was selected from the agency's quality control sample for the week
beginning March 18, 1974, and included about .2% of the annual caseload. The agency
does not maintain data on the number of claims processed during the year.
Source of information by variable analyzed:
Variable
1. Representation:

2. Results, Issues:

Source
Form 21-6796, § 24, specifies which recognized service organizations appeared
for the claimant.
Form 21-6796, §§ 15, 20, & 21.

The Rating Board form notes both winning and losing efforts on schedular and serviceconnection issues, but only a win on the unemployability or extra-schedular wage-earning
capacity issues. In a sense, every case is a loss on the extra-schedular and unemployability
issues because they could have been raised by the claimant. But it is impossible to tell from
the forms whether these issues were raised and lost, or even whether they realistically
could have been raised. The same problem arose with the "no medical impairment" issue,
except that all such cases were "losses." When the form did not indicate "no medical impairment," this issue was "iwon" because the claimant established some medical impairment.
However, it is impossible to determine whether there was a dispute over the existence of a
medical impairment.
158 Gilhooley-Veterans, supra note 81, at 25.
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Size and Source of Sample by Stage of Decisionmaking

Initial
Stage

Reconsideration
Stage

FECA a

Omitted

N/App

Social
Securityb

Omitted
N=399
100% Sample1 week

Program

Veteransc

Hearing
Stage

Final
Administrative
Review Stage

N=136
100% Sample3 months

N=206
100% Sample2 years

N=2163
10% Sample2-3 months

N=419
30% Sampleabout 1 month

Omitted

Omitted

Omitted

N/App

"N" refers to sample size. The number of cases for some variables may fluctuate. See Chart
7 infra, at notes cj, & k.
a See notes 141-46 and accompanying text supra.
' In the Social Security program, the reconsideration stage was studied by examining cases
selected by the agency for its own quality control purposes. The quality control forms contained much of the necessary data, and the agency was able to note on the forms additional
data necessary for this study. Information about'cases decided at the initial stage might
have been obtained in the same manner, but since representation is rare at the initial stage,
the number of cases that would have had to be analyzed to yield significant data was simply
too large. Because the initial and reconsideration stages follow the same procedure, however, this may not be a serious omission. Once the reconsideration stage is completed
there are two further stages of review-the hearing stage and the final administrative review stage. Time permitted study only of the hearing stage.
c In the Veterans program, the initial stage was studied because the agency summarizes the
case on a one- or two-page form that is easier to understand than the elaborate files in the
FECA program. Although its workload is heavy, the agency stlects a random sample of
cases for quality control purposes; that sample provided the data for study of the initial
stage. No effort was made to obtain the documents reporting the results of the agency's
reconsideration in cases where the claimant later appealed to the Board of Veterans Appeals. Efforts to obtain cases decided at the last stage of appeal were unsuccessful because
the agency claimed that researching the cases would interfere with the decisionmaking
process.
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Summary of Variables by Stage of Program

Veterans
initial

Soc. Sec.
reconsideration

FECA
hearing

Soc. Sec.
hearing

FECA
final
admin.
review

N=399

N=2163

N=136

N=419

N=206

57% or 6 2 %

23%

65%
(N= 140)c

58%

28%d

Representatione

60%

7%
(N=2178)f

43%
(N= 141)c

40%

32%

Hearing
requests

N/Av

N/App

42%
(N=139)c

88%

15%

Hearing held

N/Av

N/App

21%
(N= 139)c"D

88%h

15%'

New evidence presented by claimant

N/Av

N/Av

54%
(N= 126)c.J

55%
(N=365)"

N/App

Agency's use of
outside experts

N/Av

27%

23%
(N= 124)c.J

28%

N/App

Sample size
Win rate'

N/Av=data not available.
N/App=variable not applicable to program.
a Wins include remands in the FECA hearing and final administrative review stages. At the
FECA hearing stage, remands constituted 19 percent of all wins in fiscal 1973. Agency
data at the final administrative review stage do not distinguish between outright wins and
remands.
b The lower figure assumes that a zero-rated impairment is a loss even though service-connection for the impairment is established. The higher figure treats these cases (N=20)
as wins.
c One case could count as two at the FECA hearing stage for one of two reasons. First, the
case file could include two different claims filed at different times by the same claimant.
These two claims are treated as separate cases for all variables. Second, a case file could
contain both an original decision remanding the case and a report of the case after it was
returned to the hearing stage for further consideration. When this occurred, a variable
was counted twice only if it was different in the hearing stage after the remand. For example, if a hearing was requested initially but not after the case returned to the hearing
stage, one "hearing" and one "no-hearing" case were tabulated. The same is true for the
other variables at this stage of the FECA program.
I Remands at the recommendation of the Solicitor prior to consideration of a case by the
Employees' Compensation Appeals Board depress the win rate.
C See Chart 9 infra for a breakdown of representation. Percentages in Chart 7 may not equal
those in Chart 9 due to rounding.
' This figure includes 1 percent representation by "friends or relatives." These cases are
omitted from the later analysis to isolate the role of attorneys. In another 4 percent of the
cases a Congressman made an inquiry on behalf of a claimant, but these cases are not included in the 7 percent figure.
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The percentage for "hearings held" is less than that for "hearings requested" because
claims could be allowed without the hearing being held.
Due to problems in obtaining the relevant data, it is impossible to tell whether six cases
in which a hearing was requested were decided for the claimant without a hearing.
At the FECA final administrative review stage, "hearings" refer to oral argument in which
the claimant or his representative appeared, not evidentiary hearings. In six additional
cases, the government requested a hearing and no one appeared for the claimant.
The lower case count for the "new evidence presented by claimant" and "agency's use of
outside experts" variables reflects the tabulation of these variables only for those cases in
which the introduction of new evidence or use of an expert was relevant to the issue under
dispute. This refinement in the data was very difficult to apply, however, and was not attempted in other programs involving purely legal issues for which new evidence and experts would not be relevant.
The "new evidence presented by claimant" variable refers only to new evidence submitted
at the hearing.
CHART
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Summary of Issues by Stage of Program

Veterans
initial
%

Soc. Sec.
reconsideration

N

FECA
hearing
%

N

25

(35)

Soc. Sec.
hearing
%

N

FECA
final
admin.
review
%

N

Schedular

45 (180)

Wage-earning
capacity

24

(95) a

Time of origin
of medical impairmentc

18

(72)"

Timely notice

-

for

6

(8)

-

Wage rate

-

issue

2

(3)

-

Any medical
impairment

12

(46)0

2

(3)

5

(23)f

8 (17)

2

(6)

5

(7)

3

(13)

9 (21)

100 (419)

101 (226)

Other

g

Total

Information

17 (24)

4

(15)

86 (361)b

14

(32)

17 (39)

not
42 (58)

2

(7)

42

(94)

-

7

(15)

-

4

(8)

available

variablee

101 (399)

99 (138)h

h

Percentages may not equal 100% due to rounding.
In the Veterans program, "wage-earning capacity" cases include only wins on the unemployability issue (N=92) and extra-schedular determinations of ability to work (N=3).
"Any medical impairment" cases are losses on that issue. See note 157 supra for an explanation of why this method of tabulation was adopted.
bThis figure includes 226 wins on the ground that the claimant could not engage in substantial gainful employment, 90 losses on the ground that the claimant could perform his
prior job, and 45 losses on the ground that the claimant could engage in substantial gainful employment other than his old job. None of the wins involved older, unskilled labor0
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ers, for whom the test is occupational disability. This tabulation of issues and the basis for
decision corresponds to that used by the agency in its quality control study at the initial
and reconsideration stages, but the conclusions are based on a reading of the opinions.
c In the FECA program the central issue is whether the impairment "arose out of and in the
course of employment." See note 16 and accompanying text supra. In the Veterans program, the issue is whether the impairment arose while the claimant was in the armed services. See note 78 and accompanying text supra. In the Social Security program, the issue
is whether the disability arose while the claimant had insured status. See note 36 and accompanying text supra.
d The Chart treats zero-rated claims as schedular cases; if they were treated as service-connection cases, there would be 92 "timing of origin of medical impairment" cases.
C See note 148 supra.
f There were 20 "slight impairment" cases and three cases in which the impairment was not
expected to last 12 months.
9 The "other" issues are: Veterans initial stage-disability arising from misconduct (6); FECA
hearingstage-when medical impairment ended (5); entitlement to lump sum benefits (1);
entitlement to medical expenses (1); Social Securiy hearing stage-failure to cooperate (1);
claimant engaging in substantial gainful employment (2); loss by widow (10); FECA final
administrative review stage-entitlement under foreign law (6); entitlement to medical expenses (5); entitlement to lump sum benefits (3); entitlement to benefits under more than
one program (1); when medical impairment ended (6).
h The totals in the FECA program exceed the sample size in Chart 7 because more than one
important issue might arise in a case.

CHART 9

Summary of Representation by Stage of Program

Veterans
initial
%
No
Representative
Attorney
-private
practice
-legal aid
-union
Non-attorney
-union
-veterans
-otherc
Congressional
Inquiry
Total

N

40 (159)

Soc. Sec.
reconsideration
%

N

90 (1957)

FECA
hearing
%

N

Soc. Sec.
hearing
%

N

FECA
final
admin.
review
%

N

57

(80)

60 (252)

68 (141)

-

-

6

(127)

35

(50)

33 (137)

22

(45)

-

-

-

-

(48)
(2)

29 (121)
4 (16)

21
1

(44)
(1)

-

(114)
(8)0
(5)

34
1

-

5
0
0

-

-

-

1

(30)
(1)
(5)
(24)

10
2
6
2

60 (240)

-

1

(15)
(15)

-

4

(79)

-

-

60 ( 2 4 0)b

100 (399)

-

101 (2178)e

-

-

8
1
7

(11)
(1)
(10)
-

-

7
0
1
6

-

(20)
(3)
(12)
(5)

d

100 (141)'

100 (419)

Percentages may not equal 100% due to rounding.

100 (206)
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This figure includes two paralegals working for legal aid offices on the theory that they
worked under close attorney supervision.
b The veterans service organizations are: American Legion (66); Veterans of Foreign Wars
(59); Disabled American Veterans (42); American Red Cross (11); other recognized service organizations (62).
c The "other" non-attorney category consists of: Social Security reconsideration-friendsand
relatives (15); Social Security hearing-law student (1); friends and relatives (4); no further
identification possible (19); FECA final administrative review-no further identification possible (5).
d An inquiry by a member of Congress to determine the progress of the claimant's case also
occurred in 24 FECA hearing stage cases, but not as an alternative to other assistance. At
the Social Security reconsideration stage, a congressional inquiry was apparently an alternative to representation.
The representative count exceeds the sample size in Chart 7 because it includes the fifteen "friends and relatives" cases which were omitted from the statistical analysis.
' The case count exceeds the sample size in Chart 7 for the reasons given in Chart 7 supra,
at note c.
a

III
FINDINGS AND INTERPRETATION OF DATA

A. Effect of Representation on Results
1. The Data
TABLE

1A

Effect of Representation on Results by Stage of Program

Soc. Sec.
reconsideration

No representative
Representative
Total
Significance
Confidence intervals
for representative
advantage

FECA
hearing

Soc. Sec.
hearing

FECA
final
admin.
review

Win %

N

Win %

N

Win %

N

Win %

N

23
20

(1957)
(127)

57
72

(82)
(61)

48
71

(252)
(167)

24
37

(141)
(65)

23

(2084) a

64

(143) b

58

(419)

28

(206)

(NS)

(.046)

(.000)

(.039)

(-9, +3)

(+2, +28)

(+15, +31)

(+2, +25)

a The Social Security reconsideration stage data omit 79 cases in which there was an inquiry

by a member of Congress. The claimant won 34% of these cases, compared to a 23% win
rate (N=1957) for claimants without any form of help (significance = .015) (the confi-
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dence intervals for an advantage from congressional inquiry are +2, +20). The inquiry is
not technically "representation" because the Congressman neither submits evidence nor
requests hearings. Rather, he generally sends a letter expressing concern for the applicant and requesting information about the progress of the claim. If included, these cases
would be added to the "no representative" category, thereby reducing the statistical advantage for claimants with representatives.
Conversely, a congressional inquiry had no favorable effect at the FECA hearing
stage. The overall win rate was 65% (N= 140), but a claimant with a congressional inquiry
won only 50% (N=24) of the time. Perhaps the difference between Social Security and
FECA lies in the decisionmaking structure of each agency. In the FECA program, six
hearing examiners work under close supervision in the national office, whereas in Social
Security cases the decentralized structure of state agency decisionmaking allows a tilting
toward the claimant.
Another 15 Social Security reconsideration stage cases where "friends or relatives"
represented claimants were also omitted to isolate the role of attorneys. Claimants won
27% of these cases. If these cases were included, the win rate would still be 20% for represented claimants.
The case count varies from the sample size for the reasons given in Chart 7 supra, at note c.

TABLE

IB

Effect of Representation on Results-Veterans Initial Stagec
(A)
Win % N

N

No representative

58

(159)

55

(159)

American Legion

74

(66)

71

(66)

63

(225)

60

(225)

Total
Significance

(.014)

(.016)

Confidence intervals
for representative
advantage

(+5, +27)

(+5, +27)

No representative

58

(159)

55

(159)

Veterans of Foreign
Wars

74

(59)

63

(59)

62

(218)

57

(218)

Total
Significance
Confidence intervals
for representative
advantage
C

(B)
Win %

(.016)

(NS)

(+5, +27)

(-4, +20)

Column (A) for the Veterans initial stage treats the 20 zero-rated compensation cases as
wins, because service-connection was established. Column (B) treats these cases as losses,
because no disability was found.
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The study of effect of representation compares the win rates
of represented and unrepresented claimants. The data in Table IA
show that represented claimants have an advantage at the FECA
hearing and final administrative review stages, and the Social Security hearing stage, but not at the Social Security reconsideration
stage. A second analysis sought to determine whether a particular
type of representative could provide an advantage. The win rates
for claimants with particular types of representatives were compared with both the win rates for unrepresented claimants and the
win rates for claimants with different types of representatives. As
Table 1B shows, in the Veterans program, where the American
Legion or Veterans of Foreign Wars furnished counsel, particularized representation markedly improved the claimant's chance of
success.
2. Interpretation
The data do not support claims that the agency can adequately
protect the interests of the unrepresented litigant. This is true even
for the FECA and Veterans programs, which both give the claimant
the benefit of the doubt in a dispute. 159 The findings do not prove,
however, that the agencies fail to make good faith efforts to help
claimants. Instead, the data may suggest that counsel benefits
claimants notwithstanding the agencies' willingness to help.
The one program stage where represented claimants did not
have an advantage was the Social Security reconsideration stage.
This discrepancy can be explained by the difference in the issues
involved at the various program stages. A Social Security claimant
must prove both that a medical disability exists 160 and that the
disability renders him incapable of holding a job. 161 Although both
issues must be decided in every case, 1 6 2 it is widely believed that the
state agencies administering the initial and reconsideration stages
of the program focus on the medical question, and give insufficient
attention to the vocational considerations.' 6 3 The emphasis on
15 9

See notes 17, 72, 73, and accompanying text supra.
160 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (1970).
161

Id. § 423(d)(2)(A).

162 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(a)-(b) (1976).
163 STAFF REPORT, supra note 45, at 98-99. SSA asserts that only 20% of cases at the

reconsideration stage are won on vocational grounds. Id. at 98. This is consistent with the
sample data, which show that 94% of the cases in which the claimant was found disabled at
the hearing stage were based on vocational rather than medical grounds. See Chart 8 supra.
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medical issues at the reconsideration stage is a natural consequence
of the procedures used at that stage; doctors dominate the decisionmaking process and agencies render decisions on the basis of
16 4
written documents.
When medical issues predominate, counsel may not be a great
help to the claimant, 1 65 since there is less chance for a representative to gather evidence that the agency would not have discovered
on its own and to argue about the inferences to be drawn from the
underlying facts. By contrast, when the issue is less technical, as
when medical and vocational considerations determine a claimant's
wage-earning capacity, a representative's skills in producing and
marshalling evidence can markedly benefit the claimant.
Represented claimants have an advantage when the issues that
predominate are not exclusively medical. For example, at the Social
Security hearing stage, where representation significantly improved claimants' win percentage, the wage-earning capacity issue
arose in 86% of the cases. 1 66 At the FECA hearing and final administrative review stages, where counsel also helped claimants, the
degree of medical impairment, an exclusively medical issue, was
disputed in only 25% of the hearings and 14% of the final administrative proceedings; 1 6 7 the wage-earning capacity and job-relatedness issues arose in a total of 59% of the cases at both stages.168 Even
the medical issue implicit in all work-connection disputes-whether
the claimant's activity could have caused the impairment-allows
counsel more leeway to gather and interpret evidence than does
the issue of degree of current medical impairment. 6 9 In short, the
less medically technical the issues, the more advantages representation provides.
The findings for the initial stage of the Veterans program
seem to contradict this theory; representation increases a claimant's advantage even though technical medical issues are in164 See text accompanying notes 48-51 supra.

165For a view that issues involving medical expertise can be resolved in a simple manner by doctors, see Friendly, Foreword to B. SCHWARTZ & H.. WADE, LEGAL CONTROL OF
GOVERNMENT at xvi n.5 (1972). See also K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 174 (3d ed.

1972).
166See Chart 8 supra.
67
1 Id.
168 Id.

169In the Social Security program, a "timing" question analogous to the workconnection issue in FECA can arise if a presently uninsured claimant contends that he
became disabled when he was insured. This issue appeared in 2% of the Social Security
hearing stage cases. Id.
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volved. 170 Moreover, disputes over unemployability do not involve
the difficult medical and vocational issues that arise in the FECA
and Social Security programs, but turn instead largely on the fact
of unemployment. 17 1 Finally, the Veterans Administration can easily discover whether a claimant's injury occurred while he was in
the service, since it has ready access to his service medical history.
In light of these facts, represented claimants should not hold the
advantage they have in the Veterans initial stage. This anomaly can
be explained by the close relationship between the Veterans Administration and recognized service organizations. The representatives supplied by the service organizations are provided with space
free of charge at the Veterans Administration offices and enjoy an
ongoing working relationship with the agency.' 72 In this setting,
one might expect represented claimants to have an advantage over
unrepresented claimants no matter what the issue in the case.
B. Effect of Representation on Use of Procedures
1. The Data

TABLE

2A

Effect of Representation on HearingRequests by
Stage of Program

Veterans
initial
Use%

N

Soc. Sec.
reconsideration
Use%

N

No representative
Representative

Not

Not

Total
Significance
Confidence intervals
for representative's
use of procedure

170The

FECA
hearing

Soc. Sec.
hearing
N

Use%
22

(80)

67

(61)

42 (1 4 1?b
ApplicableO

Applicable

FECAfinal
admin.
review-oral
argument
only

Use%

N

Use%

N

84 (252)
95 (167)

10 (141)
26
(65)

88

(.000)

(.001)

(419)

15 (206)
(.005)

(+33,+58)

(+6,+16)

(+6,+26)

current medical impairment issue arose in 45% of the cases. Id.
See text accompanying notes 84-87 supra.
172
See Rabin, Preclusionof Judicial Review in the Processing of Claimsfor Veterans' Benefits:
A PreliminaryAnalysis, 27 STAN. L. REv. 905, 918-19 (1975).
171
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TABLE 2B

Effect of Representation on Presentation of New Evidence
by Claimant by Stage of Program

Veterans
initial
Use%

N

FECA
hearing

Soc. Sec.
reconsideration
Use%

N

Use%

Soc. Sec.
hearing

N

Use%

N

No representative

42

(71)

48 (208)

Representative

69

(55)

64 (157)

Total
Significance
Confidence intervals
for representative's
use of procedure

Data

Data

54 (126)'

55 (365)d

Not

Not

(.005)

(.003)

Available

Available

FECA final
admin.
review
Use%

N

Not

Applicable
(+13, +41)

(+8, +25)

a Evidentiary hearings are permitted, but are rare.
b The case count varies from the sample size for the reasons given in Chart 7 supra, at note c.
c The case count is less than the sample size because only cases in which new evidence could
d

be relevant were included.
The "new evidence" variable includes only cases for which an exhibit list was attached to
the case opinion. It refers only to "new evidence presented at the hearing." See Chart 7
supra, at note k.

TABLE 3
Effect of Type of Representative on Use of Procedures
at Social Security Hearing Stage

Hearing
Requests
Use%

Use%

N

Attorney

96 (137)

67 (129)

Non-attorney

93

47

Total

95

Significance
Confidence intervals
for attorney's use
of procedures
a The

N

New Evidence
Presented by
Claimant

(30)
(167)
(NS)

(-5, +11)

(28)

64 (157)a
(.072)

(+3, +37)

"new evidence presented by claimant" variable includes only cases for which an exhibit list was attached to the case opinion. It refers only to new evidence presented at the
hearing. See Chart 7 supra, at note k.
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2. Interpretation
There is no doubt that represented claimants are more likely
17 3
than unrepresented claimants to insist on procedural safeguards.
The significance levels are very low and the bottom range of the
confidence intervals never falls below 6%.
Table 3 explores the possibility of a difference in procedural
style between attorneys and non-attorneys. Only the Social Security
hearing stage has a large enough sample to provide useful data. As
Table 3 indicates, attorneys are no more likely to ask for hearings
than non-attorneys, but are more likely to present new evidence.
C. Effect of Procedures on Results
1. The Data
Once it is established that represented claimants are more
likely to take advantage of procedural opportunities, an important
question arises: Does use of these procedures increase claimants'
chances of winning?
TABLE 4A

Effect of Agency's Use of Outside Experts on Results
Veterans
initial
Win%

N

No expert
Expert

Not

Total
Significance
Confidence intervals
for expert helping
claimant

Applicable

Soc. Sec.
reconsideration
Win%

N

FECA
hearing
Win%

N

Soc. Sec.
hearing
Win%

N

20

(1585)

66

(95)

55

30

(578)

62

(29)

65 (117)

23 (2163)

65

(124)0

58 (419)

FECA final
admin. review
Win%

N

(302)

(.000)

(NS)

(.049)

(+7, +13)

(-21, +13)

(+1, +19)

Not

Applicable

a The case count is less than the sample size because only cases in which an expert's advice
could be relevant were included.

3 The only qualification to this conclusion is the data suggesting that claimants represented at the hearing stage of the Social Security program are not more likely to appeal
than unrepresented claimants. See note 130 supra.
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TABLE 4B

Effect of New Evidence Presented by Claimanton Results
Veterans
initial
Win%

N

Soc. Sec.
reconsideration
Win%

N

FECA
hearing
Win%

N

66

(58)

go new evidence
New evidence
Total
Significance

Soc. Sec.
hearing
Win%

Data

Not
Available

Not
Available

Win%

N

49 (166)

63
Data

N

FECA final
admin. review

(68)
64 (1 2 6 )"

65 (199)
58 (365)c

(NS)

(.003)

Not
Applicable

Confidence intervals
for new evidence
helping claimant

(-17, +11)

(+8, +25)

b The

case count is less than the sample size because only cases in which new evidence could
be relevant were included. The reason for the difference between the case count in the
"agency's use of outside experts" variable and the "new evidence presented by claimant"
variable is explained in Chart 7 supra, at note c.
c The "new evidence" variable includes only cases for which an exhibit list was attached to
the opinion. It refers only to new evidence presented at the hearing. See Chart 7 supra,
at note k.
TABLE 4C

Effect of Hearings on Results
Veterans
initial
Win%

N

Soc. Sec.
reconsideration
Win%

N

No hearing held
Hearing held

Not

Not

Applicable d

Applicable

Total
Significance
Confidence intervals
for hearings helping
claimant

FECA
hearing
Win%

N

Soc. Sec.
hearing
Win%

N

FECA final
admin. review
Win%

N

63 (114)

54

(48)

23

(175)

65

(29)

58 (371)

52

(31)

64 (143)

58 (419)

27 (206)

(NS)

(NS)

(.001)

(-14, +18)

(-9, +17)

(+13, +45)

Evidentiary hearings are permitted, but are rare.
e The case count varies from the sample size for reasons given in Chart 7 supra, at note c.
d

2. Interpretation
a. Agency's Use of Outside Experts. Some have charged that outside experts in Social Security disability cases are biased in favor of
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the agency. 1 7 4 The data do not support this charge. At both the
reconsideration and hearing stages, claimants benefit from the
presence of outside experts; this suggests that the agency makes a
genuine effort to assist the claimant. But the data show that the
presence of an expert is no substitute for representation at the
hearing stage.
The FECA hearing stage results are less clear. Outside experts
neither help nor hurt the claimant, which is consistent with the
inference that the agency does not use experts to the claimant's
disadvantage. However, as the width of the confidence intervals indicates (-21, + 13), the size of the sample is too small to compel this
inference.
b. Procedures Used by Claimants. (i) Social Security Hearing Stage.
As Table 4C indicates, there is no significant advantage in having a
hearing. This finding is consistent with the Supreme Court's view
in Mathews v. Eldridge1 75 that hearings are not crucial for the claimant in disability programs. 71 It does not, however, dispose of the
argument that some claimants might benefit from a hearing by
using the opportunity to demonstrate their disability; other claimants might harm their cases at a hearing by appearing to be
malingerers.
Table 4B shows that new evidence on appeal helps the claimant, and Table 2 indicates that represented claimants are more
likely to offer new evidence than unrepresented claimants. Together, these findings suggest that represented claimants have
an advantage.
Table 5 shows, however, that this advantage for represented
77
claimants persists whether or not new evidence is presented.
This lingering advantage for represented claimants may result
from representatives taking only "easy" cases. But a more plausi174See, e.g., Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 413-14 (1971) (dissenting opinion,

Douglas, J.).
175 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
171 Id. at 343-47. An earlier SSA study shows that in fiscal years 1965-1968 hearings
gave a 2.7%, 5.3%, 8.7%, and 8.1% advantage respectively. M. Rock & R. Berwanger, An
Evaluation of the SSA Appeals Process, Progress Report No. 6, at 3 (Mar. 1969).
177 The data also suggest representation remains helpful whether or not there is a
hearing. When there was a hearing, represented claimants won 70% (N= 159) of their cases,
while unrepresented claimants won only 49% (N=212) of their cases (significance .000) (the
confidence intervals for advantage of representation are + 13, +29). When there was no
hearing, the represented claimant had an advantage, but the finding is not significant,
probably because the sample size is too small. Represented claimants won 88% (N=8) of their
cases and unrepresented claimants won 48% (N=40) of their cases (the confidence intervals
for the advantage of representation are -22, +42).
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ble explanation is that counsel can skillfully organize evidence to
prove a case.
TABLE 5

Effect of Representationand Presentationof New Evidence by
Claimant on Results at Social Security Hearing Stage
New
Evidence
Win%

No New
Evidence

N

Win%

N

Win%

N

No representative

55

44 (109)

49 (208)

Representative

76 (100)

59

68 (157)

65 (199)

49 (166)

58 (365)a

(.002)

(.038)

(.001)

(+10, +32)

(+2, +28)

(+11, +27)

Total
Significance
Confidence intervals
for representative
advantage

(99)

Total

(57)

a The "new evidence" variable includes only cases for which an exhibit was attached to the
opinion. It refers only to new evidence presented at the hearing. See Chart 7supra,at notek.

(ii) FECA Hearing Stage. As Tables 4B and 4C indicate,
neither a hearing nor new evidence helps the FECA claimant, although represented claimants do have an advantage at this
stage. 178 The samples are too small, however, to determine the relationship between representation and use of procedures. 79 This
78

1

The results showing this advantage appear in Table IA supra.
the following data show, the helpful effect of representation is significant in

179 As

only one of four comparisons.
Effect of Representation and Use of Procedures
On Claimant's Win Rate at the
FECA Hearing Stage
Hearing
Held

No Hearing
Held

N

Win%

No representative

50

(6)

57

(76)

51

(31)

60

(41)

Representative

70

(23)

73

(38)

71

(38)

77

(17)

65

(29)

63 (114)

62

(69)

66

(58)

Significance
Confidence intervals
for representative
advantage

Win%

N

No New
Evidence

Win%

Total

N

New
Evidence

Win%

N

(NS)

(.048)

(NS)

(NS)

(-18, +58)

(+1, +31)

(0, +39)

(-4, +38)
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finding suggests the same conclusion as the Social Security hearing
stage data: representatives may take easy cases, but are more likely
to improve the claimant's chances of winning through effective
organization of existing evidence.
An interesting feature of the data is the failure to detect an
advantage from the presentation of new evidence at the hearing
stage, even though this helped Social Security claimants. This finding may result because the procedures at the FECA hearing stage
are a hybrid of the procedures at the hearing and prehearing
stages in other programs. The judges are not doctors, and the
decisionmakers are independent of the initial stage, both characteristics of hearing stages. However, the judges are not lawyers,
they review cases after only one stage of decisionmaking, and they
are located in the National Office of the agency responsible for
making the initial decision, all characteristics of prehearing stages.
Because of these similarities to the prehearing stages of other
programs, the agency might actively investigate cases that come before it at the hearing stage. Therefore, the presentation of new
evidence by the FECA claimant may have a less dramatic impact
than at the Social Security hearing stage.
(iii) FECA Final Administrative Review Stage. Table 4C shows
that oral argument helps the claimant win at the final administrative review stage of the FECA program. Tables 1 and 2 show that
represented claimants have an advantage and that they are more
likely to request oral argument. Because of the size of the sampler
however, it is not possible to determine the interrelationship be180
tween representation and oral argument.
The effect of counsel in hearings before the Employees'
Compensation Appeals Board might differ from that in other programs. The Board has a light caseload, which allows one of the
three judges to analyze the record exhaustively prior to consideration by the Board. This independent analysis of the case may reduce the importance of counsel's ability to persuade the Board by
written or oral argument. Therefore, although representatives may

180There are three possible interactions. First, counsel may help the claimant simply
by insisting on oral argument, even if all other help given is ineffective. Second, the beneficial effect of representation may persist without regard to oral argument, just as it persists without regard to the presentation of new evidence at the Social Security hearing
stage. See note 177 and accompanying text supra. Third, counsel might be especially effective at oral argument, if not much help otherwise.

1977]

NONADVERSARY REPRESENTATION

1035

help claimants by insisting on oral argument, it may be the oral
argument itself, regardless of the presence or absence of counsel,
that is decisive in the decisionmaking process.
IV
REACHING POLICY CONCLUSIONS

Data alone cannot determine whether representation in
nonadversary proceedings should be encouraged or discouraged.
The following discussion will deal with the factors that ought to be
taken into account in making that policy choice, and should also
provide a preliminary outline for a more complete study of the
proper role of representatives in nonadversary contexts.
A.

Value judgments
Any decision to encourage representation will depend, in part,
on value judgments. The policymaker should weigh the claimant's
interest in the adjudication, the importance of giving the claimant a
sense of fair treatment and meaningful participation in the administrative process, the legitimacy of paternalistically protecting
the claimant's award from depletion by counsel fees, and the value
placed on lowering the government's cost of administration. Empirical data could aid the policymaker in making relevant value
judgments, since the value judgments themselves may be based on
certain factual assumptions which can be empirically tested.
1. Importance of Income Maintenance Claims
Historically, this country has not enthusiastically supported income maintenance programs. As late as 1955, the Hoover Commission recommended that participants in administrative proceedings
be allowed to appear with a representative, except in proceedings
granting "voluntary benefits."' 18 1 But the pendulum has now swung
in the other direction. The income maintenance claimant has an
"entitlement," if not a "right," to benefits, 82 which the state cannot
181 COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT,

LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURES 31-32 (1955).
182The history of the development of the "entitlement" approach begins with Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960), in which the Court denied a Social Security claimant's
assertion that government action was arbitrary, but stated that the claim had "sufficient
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discontinue without affording him procedural due process. 1 83
Moreover, sympathy for the poor continues to surface, sometimes
84
in unexpected ways.'
Despite occasionally conservative rhetoric, Congress in recent
years has expressed a growing concern for income maintenance
claimants. It federalized the welfare programs for the aged, blind,
and disabled 1 8 5 and nearly federalized the Aid to Dependent Children program. 8 6 Congress also drastically expanded the Food

substance to fall within the protection from arbitrary governmental action afforded by the
Due Process Clause." Id. at 611. Then in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), the
Court held that a state could not call unemployment insurance benefits a privilege, and
therefore deny them to a claimant who would not work on Saturday for religious reasons.
Id. at 404-06. Finally, in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), the Supreme Court explicitly held that an income maintenance claimant had an "entitlement" protected by the
fourteenth amendment. Id. at 262.
183 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266-71 (1971). See generally Note, Specifying the
ProceduresRequired by Due Process: Toward Limits on the Use of Interest Balancing, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1510 (1975). See also Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973), in which the Court
denied free judicial review of welfare decisions, but stressed that the claimant had received
an administrative hearing free of charge. Id. at 659-60.
The Supreme Court has distinguished between claims for need-based benefits and
claims for social insurance benefits, suggesting that the former require greater protection.
Compare Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 340-41 (1976), with Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, 261 (1970). This distinction is unfortunate, since many social insurance applicants are undoubtedly needy. In 1970, for example, 90% of prior workers receiving Social
Security disability benefits had no earnings. Franklin, Earnings of Disabled-Worker
Beneficiaries, 37 Soc. SEC. BULL., June 1974, at 18, 19. Moreover, social insurance protects
claimants from complete dependence on the dole. Merriam, Income Maintenance:Social Insurance and Public Assistance, in SOCIAL SECURITY IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 55, 56,

58-61 (S.
Jenkins ed. 1969).
184 Several cases decided on the theory that the government's action failed a
"minimum rationality" test contain references to the burdens that the challenged legislative
classification imposed on the poor. E.g., Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S.
528, 538 (1973) (requirement that households receiving food stamps consist of related individuals fell heaviest on those "desperately in need"); James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128,
141-42 (1972) ("[s]tate recoupment laws ... need not blight in such discriminatory fashion
the hopes of indigents for self-sufficiency and self-respect"); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S.
56, 79 (1972) (double-bond requirement imposed "particularly obvious" burden on poor).
The Supreme Court has also decided that overreaching of the poor in contract negotiations may void a waiver of constitutional rights to a hearing (Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67, 95 (1972)), and that one reason for striking down a vagrancy statute on vagueness
grounds was its use against the poor (Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156,
170 (1972)).
15Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 301, 86 Stat. 1465
(codified
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381, 1381a (Supp. V 1975)).
86
See 58 CORNELL L. REV. 803-04 nn.1-3 (1973). See generally P. MOYNIHAN, THE
POLITICS OF A GUARANTEED INCOME

(1973).
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Stamp program from a farmers' subsidy to a welfare program,' 87
added Social Security disability beneficiaries to the Medicare
rolls, 188 and, during the recent recession, made Unemployment
Insurance benefits available for a longer period than in any previous economic slump.'8 9
One could argue that disability claimants are more likely to be
members of the "undeserving poor" than, for example, claimants
to old age assistance, because of the possibility that disability claimants malinger. 190 Historically, however, disability claimants show a
greater risk of malingering than the aged, but less than the ablebodied unemployed. 191
The value given to income maintenance claims is obviously
relevant to a decision on whether to make representation available
to claimants, even if counsel help claimants win cases they should
not win. Unequal opportunity to win claims resulting from unequal
availability of procedural opportunities, such as the use of counsel,
is itself a serious problem. Fundamental fairness requires that in
proceedings affecting a claimant's ability to meet basic needs, important procedural advantages should be equally available to all.
Of course, the quality of the available procedural protection will
vary, but the inevitable imperfections encountered in reaching for
equality do not make it a worthless goal. Claimants will find it hard
to understand reasoning that proceeds from the premise that, since
not all representatives are equally good, representation should thus
not be available to everyone.

187 See Pub. L. No. 91-671, 84 Stat. 2048 (1971) (amending 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2026
(1970)).
1"8Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 201(a)(2), 86 Stat. 1371 (1972) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1395c
(Supp. V 1975)).
18 The Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-572,
§§ 101-105, 88 Stat. 1869, as amended by Pub. L. No. 94-12, § 701, 89 Stat. 65 (1975) and
Pub. L. No. 94-45, § 101(a)(2), 89 Stat. 236 (1975), extended benefits to one year and three
months during temporary periods of high unemployment. Previous extensions during recessions had been for a shorter period, never more than a year. See Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-224, 85 Stat. 810; Temporary Extended
Unemployment Compensation Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-6, 75 Stat. 8; Temporary Unemployment Compensation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-441, 72 Stat. 171.
190 See generally tenBroek & Wilson, Public Assistance and Social Insurance-A Normative
Evaluation, 1 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 237, 241 (1954).
191
See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 341 (1976).
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2. Importance of the Claimant's Sense of FairTreatment and
Meaningful Participation
A representative does more than help his client win. Counsel
play an important role in assuring claimants that they are fairly
treated and have an opportunity to participate meaningfully in the
decisionmaking process.1 92 In income maintenance proceedings,
where the claimants are likely to feel especially vulnerable, 19 3 these
even if it
considerations might justify allowing representation
94
win.'
to
ability
claimant's
the
affect
would.not
Legitimacy of Government Paternalismin
ProtectingAwards from Depletion by Counsel Fees
Depletion of the claimant's award militates against encouraging representation in income maintenance cases. Any effort to
protect the claimant's award from depletion, however, assumes
that the government ought to interfere with private arrangements
for hiring counsel.' 95 The degree of interference with the claimant's choice is also relevant; for example, scrutinizing the reasonableness of counsel fees produces less interference than barring a
1 96
particular type of representative from appearing.
3.

192 A recent description of the goals of procedural systems omits the claimant's sense
of fair treatment and meaningful participation, referring only to accuracy and the costs of
operating the system. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 333 (1972).

In making an inquiry into this issue, one must distinguish between "fair treatment"
and "meaningful participation." A claimant may feel that he has been fairly treated within
the boundaries of the applicable legal standard, but still feel bewildered by a system that
does not allow him to present his real concerns to the agency, and therefore deprives him
of meaningful participation. More data is needed to determine whether counsel would
contribute to a claimant's sense of meaningful participation, although representation would
likely encourage a feeling of fair treatment. A recent study found that the litigant's freedom to choose counsel had a favorable effect on his view of the fairness of procedures, but
no significant effect on his sense of control or involvement in the decisionmaking process.
See J. THIBAUT & L. WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 84-85, 90-91 (1975).
193 Kafka learned much about the world by working for a government agency that
dispensed disability benefits. M. BROD, FRANZ KAFKA 79-84 (1969).
194 The importance of providing litigants with procedural opportunities becomes
clouded, however, when one considers the possibility that procedures will be an empty
formalism masking the real decisionmaking process. In that case, the availability of procedures might only heighten the litigant's cynicism rather than increase his sense of involvement. See Wilkinson, Goss v. Lopez: The Supreme Court as School Superintendent, 1975 SuP. CT.
REV. 25, 72.

195 Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The "Art" of Overruling, 1963 SuP. CT. REV. 211, 243-44.
196 If regulation of counsel fees limits the claimant's choice of counsel, it becomes important to know if unpaid counsel are available to take the claimant's case.
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4. Importance of Reducing Administrative Costs
If the participation of counsel in administrative proceedings
increases administrative costs, the importance placed on lowering
costs will influence any judgment about whether to encourage
representation. 1 97 It may seem heartless to worry about such considerations when individual rights are at issue, but at some point
the problem of excessive governmental expenditures will determine the kind of procedures to provide, especially if elimination of
a particular procedural safeguard would not drastically affect the
claimant's basic rights.
In Goldberg v. Kelly, 198 the leading case on procedural protections for income maintenance claimants, the Supreme Court
largely ignored the cost problem involved in implementing its decision to require an evidentiary hearing before termination of
benefits. 199 Later cases, however, indicate that the Court will indeed consider the cost of fairness. In Richardson v. Perales,20 0 for
example, the Court emphasized the burdens that oral testimony
would place on the agency. 20 1 Even where suspect classifications
are scrutinized, there is a growing concern over administrative
costs.

20 2

B. Relevant Data
In addition to data relevant to forming value judgments and
to understanding the interaction of representatives with the decisionmaking process, it is important to obtain information about the
efficacy of measures that an agency could take in lieu of encouraging counsel to appear. For example, assuming that representa197 If representation is encouraged, agencies will have to hire new staff, since counsel
are likely to insist on formal procedures. Representatives may also save money, however,
by investigating cases and thereby reducing the burden on the agency of obtaioing evidence.
198397 U.S. 254 (1970).
199Apparently the Court took cost into account only in not requiring a transcript of
the hearing or a full written opinion. See id. at 267, 271.
200 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
20t Id. at 406. Cf. Richardson v. Wright, 405 U.S. 208, 209 (1972) (issue of claimanes

alleged right to oral presentation not reached).
202 Compare Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S 677, 688-90 (1972) (discrimination against
women), with Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 509-10 (1976) (discrimination against illegitimate children). Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975), in which the Court upheld
a conclusive presumption, also exhibits an increased awareness of administrative costs by
reversing a trend in which the Court disallowed statutory presumptions and required costly
case-by-case determinations.
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tives assist claimants by gathering and/or interpreting evidence,
the agency could increase its staff of judges or legal assistants to
2 3
enhance its own ability to gather and interpret evidence. 0 If
hearings help claimants win, the agency could initiate hearings
on its own. If representatives are helpful in resolving those less
technical issues that earlier stages bypass, 2 114 the agency could redesign its procedures to encourage resolution of these issues by allowing hearings at an earlier stage of the decisionmaking process, by
increasing the use of experts at the earlier stage, or by allowing
claimants to bypass the earlier stage entirely. Any of these mea2 5
sures might prove less costly than encouraging representation. 11
C. Rules Affecting Representation
1. DiscouragingRepresentation
a. Prohibiting Representation. There are only two situations
where prohibition of representation is lawful. First, when an
agency conducts a preliminary investigation to decide whether to
commence a proceeding that might eventually affect an individual,
203 Agencies vary in their use of such assistants. See notes 32, 98, and accompanying
text supra.
204 See text accompanying note 165 supra.
205 Closer judicial scrutiny of proceedings in which the claimant is not represented will
not provide the needed protection. The effectiveness of judicial review as a remedy depends on taking an appeal in the first place, yet it is unclear whether unrepresented claimants are as likely as represented claimants to pursue continued review. See note 130 supra.
Furthermore, once the courts become concerned about unrepresented claimants, they will
have to deal with two situations which present even more intractable problems: situations
where counsel is present but does an inadequate job (e.g., Arms v. Gardner, 353 F.2d 197
(6th Cir. 1965); Sandoval v. Rattikin, 395 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 901 (1966)), and where the representative is a non-attorney (e.g., Webb v. Finch,
431 F.2d 1179 (6th Cir. 1970) (friend with experience in Social Security litigation helped
claimant); Pilapil v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 424 F.2d 6, 10 (10th Cir. 1970) (law
student's strategy same as 80% of experienced representatives)).
The courts have taken three approaches to the problem of unrepresented claimants in
Social Security cases: (1) No special care for unrepresented claimants is necessary beyond
notice of the right to counsel (Herridge v. Richardson, 464 F.2d 198, 200 (5th Cir. 1972);
Cross v. Finch, 427 F.2d 406, 408-09 (10th Cir. 1970)); (2) Special care for unrepresented
claimants is necessary whenever the claimant has neglected material evidence in presenting
his case (Stewart v. Cohen, 309 F. Supp. 949, 956 (E.D.N.Y. 1970); Hodges v. Celebrezze,
232 F. Supp. 419, 427 (W.D. Ark. 1964)); and (3) Special care for unrepresented claimants
is necessary only if, in addition to having failed to develop material evidence, the claimant
is especially vulnerable because of mental trouble or lack of education (Garrett v. Richardson, 471 F.2d 598, 603 (8th Cir. 1972); Torres v. Secretary of HEW, 337 F. Supp. 1329,
1332 (D.P.R. 1971); Zeno v. Secretary of HEW, 331 F. Supp. 1095, 1097 (D.P.R. 1970);
Hennig v. Gardner, 276 F. Supp. 622, 625 (N.D. Tex. 1967); Staskel v. Gardner, 274 F.
Supp. 861, 864 (E.D. Pa. 1967)). The last approach is the most common.
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representation is occasionally disallowed on the theory that it will
unduly delay the proceedings. 0 6 Second, representation is sometimes prohibited when the agency and the individual are involved
in a continuing relationship that adversary hearings might seriously affect.2 07 Income maintenance
programs, however, do not fit
20 8
either of these categories.
b. Notice that Counsel Are Not Necessary. Certain ways of discouraging counsel fall short of outright prohibition and cannot be
dismissed as improper, since their impact on the claimant is less
severe. For example, in the FECA and Social Security programs
the agency tells the claimant that representation is not needed at
the initial stage; SSA is not even required to inform the claimant of
2
his right to counsel at this stage unless he inquires about it. 09
Agencies probably discourage counsel because they believe that
they can adequately protect the unrepresented claimant's interests,
and that they should try to save the claimant unnecessary counsel
fees. If representatives at this stage increase administrative costs
without significantly helping claimants, this mild interference with
the claimant's ability to choose counsel freely might be desirable.
c. Fee Limits. A requirement that the agency approve the
reasonableness of the representative's fee is a common provision in
income maintenance programs. 210 Arguably, fee approvals discourage counsel from taking cases, but it is equally plausible that
the claimant's freedom from being overcharged encourages him
to seek out counsel when he might otherwise avoid hiring a rep-

206 See In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 334 (1957); Nason v. Immigration & Naturalization
Serv., 370 F.2d 865, 868 (2d Cir. 1967); Haaland v. Pomush, 263 Minn. 506, 511-13, 117
N.W.2d 194, 198-99 (1962); Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 443 Pa. 117, 142-45, 277 A.2d
764, 777 (1971). It is unclear whether the prohibition would apply to non-attorneys who
share the agency's objectives. See Madera v. Board of Educ., 386 F.2d 778, 778 (2d Cir.
1967); Suess v. Pugh, 245 F. Supp. 661, 665 (N.D.W. Va. 1965).
217 See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583-84 (1975) (school discipline); Kirp, Proceduralism and Bureaucracy:Due Process in the School Setting, 28 STAN. L. REv. 841 (1976). See
also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 25-31 (1966).
208 First, there is nothing preliminary about the denial of a claim after an initial investigation, and claimants have no incentive to delay. Second, income maintenance claimants
are independent bearers of rights rather than dependents who rely on the continuing good
will of
the agency.
209
See text accompanying notes 116 & 120 supra.
210See notes 118, 123, 127, and accompanying text supra. Agency approval of reasonable fees has been upheld in Yeiser v. Dysart, 267 U.S. 540, 541 (1925). See also Randolph
v. United States, 274 F. Supp. 200 (M.D.N.C. 1967), aff'd, 389 U.S. 570 (1968) (statutory
restrictions on fees in Social Security); Thatcher v. Industrial Comm'n, 115 Utah 568, 207
P.2d 178 (1949) (administrative regulation of fees in workers' compensation cases).
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resentative.2 11 Federal policy favors the reasonable-fees approach,
despite its interference with the client's right to bargain with
counsel. Congress has explicitly refused to replace fee approvals
with an agency review of attorney-client agreements, subject to
judicial review at the agency's request if the parties and the agency
212
cannot agree.
Fee limits set so low that they effectively prevent representation by private counsel present an entirely different problem. For
instance, the Veterans disability program limits fees to $10,213
thereby effectively prohibiting representation by private counsel
and severely interfering with the claimant's selection of a representative. At the same time, however, service organizations provide free and effective representation. 21 4 This alternate source of
counsel may justify a virtual prohibition of private counsel, at least
for work done at the initial stage of decisionmaking.
d. DiscouragingNon-attorneys. Prohibition of the unauthorized
practice of law may place restrictions on representation by nonattorneys. However, this proscription usually applies only to adversary proceedings, 21 5 and none of the programs studied prohibits non-attorneys from representing claimants. 21 6 Several good
reasons exist for allowing a claimant to use a non-attorney in
nonadversary proceedings. First, nonadversary litigation is less
complex than adversary proceedings. Second, nonadversary programs bear no risk of unequal confrontation likely to result in loss
by the litigant with inferior counsel. Any difference between attorneys and non-attorneys representing the claimant will mean only
that the claimant decreases his chance of winning if he is counseled
by the less effective representative. Third, this study suggests that
attorneys may not always be more successful than non-attorneys in
nonadversary programs. Attorneys are not helpful at the Social
Security reconsideration stage, and non-attorneys do help the
211 See note 113 and accompanying text supra.
212 Viles, supra note 113, at 59-60 n.279.

38 U.S.C. § 3404(c)(2) (1970).
See text accompanying note 126 supra; Table lB supra.
21- Annot., 2 A.L.R.3d 724, 728-29 (1965) notes that non-attorneys have been allowed
to handle workers' compensation claims before the adversary stage has been reached, but
are not allowed to appear once the proceedings become adversary. The effect such a rule
will have on the willingness of non-attorneys to settle cases prior to the stage at which they
will be replaced by attorneys is unclear.
"'6See notes 115, 119, 124, and accompanying text supra. The only discrimination
against non-attorneys is the statute which authorizes SSA to pay fees directly to counsel only
if they are attorneys. See 42 U.S.C. § 406(a) (1970).
213
214
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claimant at the Veterans initial stage.21 7 Fourth, where attorneys do
not customarily handle income maintenance claims, a non-attorney
2 18
may provide a better chance of winning.
Finally, one ought to consider if the right to choose counsel
fosters the claimant's sense of fairness in the administrative process. This is especially important in income maintenance programs,
where claimants may feel vulnerable when confronted by the government bureaucracy. Free choice of counsel may also increase
the claimant's sense of meaningful participation in the decisionmaking process.2 1 9
2.

EncouragingRepresentation

a. Free Counsel. Providing free counsel in all cases encourages
representation, but at a high cost. At one time the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare toyed with the idea of requiring
states to provide free counsel in needs-tested welfare proceedings, 220 and a few courts have exercised their discretion to order
free counsel in such cases, 22 ' but little pressure now exists to pro2 7

' See Table 1B supra.
218 Cf Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969) (voiding state ban on jailhouse lawyers
where more formal counsel unavailable).
219 The organized bar is primarily concerned with non-attorneys as legal assistants to
attorneys, not with expanding available legal services. Because of attorney supervision of
legal assistants, the question of unauthorized practice of law is not likely to arise. Low
income claimants, however, are more interested in paraprofessionals as a means of expanding available legal services and obtaining cheaper and more sympathetic representation. See
NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE FOR LEGAL SERVICES, A COMPILATION OF MATERIALS FOR LEGAL

ASSISTANTS AND LAY ADVOCATES (M. Ader ed. 1971); Brickman, Expansion of the Lawyering
Process Through a New Delivery System: The Emergence and State of Legal Paraprofessionalism,71
COLUM. L. REV. 1153, 1165-68 (1971).
22 See 34 Fed. Reg. 1,356 (1969); 33 Fed. Reg. 17,853 (1968). After postponing the
effective date (34 Fed. Reg. 13,595 (1969)), HEW deleted the requirement from the welfare regulations (35 Fed. Reg. 10,591 (1970)).
221 See, e.g., Aiello v. Commissioner of Pub. Welfare, 358 Mass. 91, 260 N.E.2d 662
(1970); Ebenhart v. Goldberg, 1 Pov. L. REP. (CCH) 659.98 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969). Contra,
Granger v. Finch, 425 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1970) (Social Security); Staley v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 6 Cal. App. 3d 675, 86 Cal. Rptr. 294 (1970) (Unemployment Insurance). The authority for courts to order free counsel in civil cases usually rests
on a general statutory grant of authority or on the inherent equity powers of the courts.
Silverstein, Waiver of Court Costs and Appointment of Counsel for Poor Persons in Civil Cases, 2
VAL. L. REV. 21, 49 (1968). Occasionally, however, a statute creating substantive rights will
explicitly authorize appointment of free counsel (see Petete v. Consolidated Freightways,

313 F. Supp. 1271 (N.D. Tex. 1970)), or a court will find authority in the Constitution to
appoint free counsel (see Note, Parents'Right to Counsel in Dependency and Neglect Proceedings,
49 IND. L.J. 167 (1973)). Federal courts must exercise their discretion in civil cases to
decide whether free counsel should be appointed, even though they rarely grant such a
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vide free counsel for income maintenance claimants. 222 The con22 3
trast between criminal litigation, where free counsel is provided,
and income maintenance disputes suggests why free counsel may
be less appropriate in income maintenance proceedings. The
criminal defendant's interest in retaining freedom and avoiding
the stigma of conviction is greater than the income maintenance
claimant's interest in his own litigation. Criminal litigation also involves procedural rules that are far more technical than in the
programs, and the proceedadministration of income maintenance
2 24
ings are almost exclusively adversary.
Moreover, the practical problems of providing free counsel in
all cases are enormous. Procuring an adequate number of representatives may not be easy,2 25 and if counsel are not paid, the
additional problem of unfairness to the representatives exists. 22 6
These considerations suggest that the policymaker should be cautious in using the data in Tables IA and lB showing that representation is helpful before concluding that free counsel should be
provided-the bottom range for that advantage in the FECA program is only 2%. Of course, if the policymaker's disposition is toward providing free counsel in any event, he certainly will note that
the FECA sample shows an advantage for represented claimants
of up to 28% at the hearings stage and 25% at the final administra2 27
tive review stage.
request. See Smith v. Blackledge, 451 F.2d 1201, 1203 (4th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Madden, 352 F.2d 792, 793 (9th Cir. 1965).
222 However, Congress recently authorized free legal help for claimants in the
Longshoremen's program. Act of Oct. 27, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-576, § 17, 86 Stat. 1262
(amending 33 U.S.C. § 939(c)(1) (1970)). This is an unusual provision for a workers' compensation program, where contingent fees usually attract attorneys. The legislation may be
justified, however, as a residual measure to protect claimants in adversary proceedings.
223 See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
224 Cf. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 317-18 (1973) (no free counsel allowed in
nonadversary photographic identifications of offender by witnesses).
225 Cf Note, Dollars and Sense of an Expanded Right to Counsel, 55 IOWA L. REv. 1249,
1259 (1970) (few attorneys willing to provide assistance to indigent criminal defendants).
226 Most courts hold that appointed counsel must work for nothing if requested to do
so. See, e.g., United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 635 (9th Cir. 1965). It is doubtful that a
court has the power to order payment absent a statute. Allison v. Wilson, 277 F. Supp. 271
(N.D. Cal. 1967), holds that the power of appointment implies a power to commit federal
funds to pay counsel. Id. at 275. But the court in In re Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d 433, 330 N.E.2d
53, 369 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1975), concluded that, absent specific statutory or constitutional authorization, no right to paid or appointed counsel exists. Id. at 437, 330 N.E.2d at 55, 369
N.Y.S.2d at 90. The effect of the Supreme Court decision in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651 (1974) (courts cannot order damage awards to be paid out of state treasury) on the
power of federal courts to order payment of counsel fees by the state is also uncertain. See
Fees and the Eleventh Amendment, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1875, 1876 (1975).
Note,22Attorneys'
7
See Table 1A supra.
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b. Payment of Winning Counsel's Fees. The government might
encourage representation by paying the winning counsel's fees.
The tradition in the United States has been to limit the payment
of winning counsel's fees to cases involving the opposing party's
bad faith, 22 8 to situations where the results of the litigation
confer benefits on persons from whom one can reasonably demand a contribution to the costs of counsel, 229 and to a limited
number of situations where a plaintiff, acting as a "private attorney general," has vindicated a strong public policy, and is entitled
to reimbursement

for litigation

costs. 2 30

Despite this limiting

tradition, however, other reasons justify subsidizing winning
counsel in those nonadversary income maintenance proceedings in which they prove especially helpful after the initial
stages.
First, when the government pays the fees, the costs are spread
out over the general public as an administrative cost. 23 1 Second,

winning counsel help the agency discharge its obligation to protect
the claimant's interests in nonadversary proceedings. If the
agency's efforts in this direction fail prior to the hearing stage,
winning counsel would serve a useful function in helping the government correct a prior error, and their appearance should be
232
encouraged by relieving the claimant of the cost.

This argument for paying the fees of winning counsel is subject to two qualifications. If the results prove inaccurate, it is difficult to argue that counsel help the agency fulfill its obligations.
Also the production of previously unavailable evidence, and not
error at the initial stage, may account for the claimant's success on
appeal. However, the earlier analysis on the effect of representation at the Social Security hearing stage suggests that the agency's
22

' See Guardian Trust Co. v. Kansas City S. Ry., 28 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1928).
229 See Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntaiy Clients: Attorney Fees from Funds, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 1597 (1974).
230 In Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975), the Supreme Court held that federal courts are not free to impose attorney fees under this
theory absent express provision by statute. Id. at 265-69. Congress, however, in response to
Alyeska, recently provided a list of statutes under which private attorney general fees may
be allowed. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (Dec. Supp. 1976). See also Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntar, Clients in Public Interest Litigation, 88 HARV. L. REV. 849 (1975).
231See Brewer v. School Bd., 456 F.2d 943, 951-52 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 933
(1972).
232 Analogous provisions sometimes appear in adversary workers' compensation programs that require a defendant to pay claimant's counsel fees if the claimant receives a
greater award on appeal than the defendant offered in settlement. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C.
§ 928(b) (Supp. V 1975) (Longshoremen's program). See also 3 A. LARSON, THE LAw OF
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 83.12, .19, .40 (1976).
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shift in perspective plays a major role in the reversal of earlier
2 33
denials.
Any decision to pay the costs of winning counsel is clouded by
the uncertainty of the decision's effect on the agency's costs and on
the claimant's sense of meaningful participation in the decisionmaking process. Moreover, such a decision would require further
evaluation of whether to pay the cost of counsel when the fees are
financed through a legal insurance program or a prepaid group
legal services plan to which the claimant belongs,2 34 or when a legal
235
services organization provides free counsel.
c. Payment of Fees to Counsel Out of an Award. An agency can
encourage representation by paying counsel fees out of the
claimant's award directly to the representative.2 3 6 Unlike providing
free counsel in all cases, or paying fees to winning counsel, this
method of encouraging representation is not costly to the government.
Once the claimant is permitted to choose counsel freely, it
seems appropriate to help counsel collect their fees. Arguably, such
help is improper if representatives do not help the claimant win.
But if the data suggest that counsel are too costly in light of the
help they render, the correct step is to confront this problem directly by deciding whether to restrict access to counsel by prohibiting or limiting fees. Failure to help counsel collect fees is an indirect way of discouraging representation, and deflects attention
from the real issue of whether costly representation should be allowed at all.
Providing assistance to the claimant's counsel might seem improper if the fee is unreasonable, but a requirement that the
233 See text accompanying notes 161-64 supra.
234 See generally Hearings on Recent Developments in Prepaid Legal Services Plans Before the

Subcomm. on Representation of Citizen Interests of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1974); F.

MARKS,

R.

HALLAUER, & R. CLIFTON, CONFERENCE ON PREPAID LEGAL

SERVICES (1972).
23

See generally Note, Award of Attorney's Fees to Legal Aid Offices, 87 HARV. L. REV. 411
(1973). Reasonable fees might be paid to legal services organizations on the theory that
they will only take such cases when the private bar is reluctant to act and, therefore, encouragement of their appearance will overcome a barrier to representation. Moreover,
such organizations are likely to develop an expertise in income maintenance litigation that
private attorneys may lack.
2316The Social Security program currently pays up to 25% of an award for counsel

fees. See note 123 supra. Such payments are also provided in the Veterans program (38
U.S.C. § 3404 (1970)), but are unimportant because of the dominance of service organizations providing free representation and the absence of private practitioners. See Chart 9
supra.
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agency approve the fee eliminates this objection. There may also be
occasions when the fee will have to be paid out of a future award.
The past-due award may be too small to cover the fee, or concern
for the claimant's well-being might suggest spreading out the payment so that the past-due benefits are not excessively reduced. In
such circumstances, the administrative burden is increased by the
-need to flag future payments so that a portion will be paid to the
representative. However, agency record-keeping systems should be
able to cope with this problem in the limited number of cases where
it will arise.
d. Notice that RepresentationIs Helpful. The least costly method
of encouraging counsel is to tell the claimant that a representative
may be helpful. 2 37 It is the agency's job to prevent unequal results
caused by unequal access to counsel. The following notice might
therefore be sent to claimants: "You may obtain the assistance of a
representative in presenting your appeal. Although the reviewing
agency will do all it can to decide your appeal fairly, you may find a
representative helpful to you in presenting your case."
This notice may be inadequate, however, since many claimants
are probably wary of counsel and unfamiliar with the different
types of representatives. The notice should therefore inform the
claimant of the types of counsel likely to be available in the
community. 23 8 An appropriate notice might read:
237

Courts do not usually require a notice that counsel may be helpful. In Staley v.

California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 6 Cal. App. 3d 675, 86 Cal. Rptr. 294 (1970),
the court suggested, but did not require, notice that free legal assistance was available. Id.
at 679, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 296. Cf. Granger v. Finch, 425 F.2d 206, 208 (7th Cir. 1970)
(notice of right to counsel sufficient; informing claimant of contingent fee possibility unnecessary). But see Miner v. Industrial Comm'n, 115 Utah 88, 202 P.2d 557, 559 (1949) (must
tell claimant that counsel is "desirable"). Sometimes a holding that representation may not be
discouraged, however, comes close to a finding that representation must be encouraged. In
Coyle v. Gardner, 298 F. Supp. 609 (D. Hawaii 1969), the court examined the transcript to
see whether, in light of claimant's inadequate education, the notice of a right to counsel
amounted to a discouragement of counsel. Id. at 612-13.
238 The Social Security Administration is obviously concerned about the problem. The
Claims Manual gives the following instructions to district office personnel for dealing with
claimants who express an interest in representation:
(c) Advising Claimants of Legal Service Organizations.SSA will not routinely inform claimants of legal service organizations. Some claimants may prefer to have
an attorney in private practice or a nonattorney represent them. In addition, to
inform a claimant of legal service organizations when he has not indicated an
interest in or need for such information would make it appear SSA is recommending such organization.
The DO should maintain a list of legal service organizations . . . where a
claimant may obtain legal services. If a claimant wants an attorney to represent
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Examples of representatives who may be available in your
community include attorneys in private practice, unions and veterans organizations, claimant's representatives licensed by law to
present claims before this agency, and legal aid or legal services
organizations providing free legal assistance.
CONCLUSION

The data in this study suggest that counsel help claimants win
their cases in most stages of most nonadversary programs. The
study also indicates that a range of unanswered questions must be
resolved before agencies can make intelligent policy choices about
the desirability of taking costly steps to encourage representation.
However, the results suggest that agencies ought to take the inexpensive first step of encouraging the income maintenance claimant
to seek out a representative. Although a small step, it may contribute significantly to eliminating the inequality of results brought
about by inequality of representation.
him but has difficulty in obtaining legal services or asks for information, he
should be notified of legal service organizations available in the area.
CLAIMS MANUAL, supra note 120, at § 3505(c).

